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California Supreme Court Survey
April 1995 - August 1995
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent
decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the read-
er of issues that the supreme court has addressed, as well as to serve as a start-
ing point for researching any of the topical areas. Attorney discipline, judicial
misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omitted from the survey.
The survey will review California Supreme Court cases in either and article
or summary format. Articles provide an in-depth analysis of selected California
Supreme Court cases including the potential impact a case may have on Califor-
nia law. Additionally, articles guide the reader to secondary sources that focus
on specific points of law.
Summaries provide a brief outline of the areas of law addressed in selected
California Supreme Court cases. Summaries are designed to provide the reader
with a basic understanding of the legal implications of a cases in a concise
format.
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I. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Criminal defendants have standing to object to a
witness' involuntary custodial statements if it is alleged
such a violation actually taints that witness' trial testi-
mony; however, criminal defendants have the burden of
proving such coercion actually affected the reliability of
the testimony received at trial:
People v. Badgett ............................ 1401
B. Police may not base a temporary detention solely upon a
person's flight at the sight of police:
People v. Souza ............................... 1409
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II. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
The voter initiative power is broader than the referen-
dum power and includes the ability to prospectively re-
peal a tax ordinance:
Rossi v. Brown ................................ 1419
III. MORTGAGES
A lender's fraud action against a third party who in-
duced the lender to make loans is not barred by the
lender's purchase of the property by full credit bid at a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale:
Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell ................ 1429
IV. PROBATE
A trustee has standing to appeal a determination that a
trust beneficiary's proposed claim would not violate the
trust's no contest provision:
Estate of Goulet v. Goulet ...................... 1435
V. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
During a state of emergency where aerial spraying of
malathion is used to eradicate the Mediterranean fruit
fly, manufacturers and distributors of malathion are
under no private tort duty of care to warn the public
after they become aware of deficiencies in the State's
warnings to the public:
Macias v. State ................................ 1444
VI. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A person who is convicted of a crime and who elects to
perform community service, instead of paying a fine, is
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Act:
Arriaga v. County of Alameda .................... 1450
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A transfer of the county clerk's duties as ex officio
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term.
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2d 1312, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766 ..................... 1456
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A. A single prior conviction for driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol and its resulting prison term can be
used both to elevate a current drunk driving convic-
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violating the bar against multiple punishment of an
act or omission.
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December 21, 1995, 12 Cal. 4th 145, 906 P.2d 1232, 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 ............... ............... 1457
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B. Absent a request by the defendant, trial courts are
not required to define the phrase "reckless indiffer-
ence to human life" to the jury as it used in the felo-
ny-murder special circumstance of California Penal
Code, section 190.2, because the statutory meaning
of the phrase is adequately conveyed by a common
understanding of its terms.
People v. Estrada, Supreme Court of California, decided
November 20, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th 568, 904 P.2d 1197, 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d 586 ............................... 1458
C. Materiality is an element of perjury which must be
decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt and
failure to instruct the jury on the materiality ele-
ment constitutes a per se reversible error.
People v. Kobrin, Supreme Court of California, decided
November 2, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th 416, 903 P.2d 1027, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d 895 ............................... 1459
IV. Highways and Automobiles
Drivers convicted outside California must attack the
constitutionality of those convictions in that jurisdic-
tion rather than through a writ of mandate brought
against a California agency that suspended privileges
as a result of that conviction.
Larsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, Supreme Court
of California, decided December 26, 1995, 12 Cal. 4th
278, 906 P.2d 1306, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 ............ 1460
V. Initiative
A county's general plans may be amended by initia-
tive of the local electorate.
Devita v. County of Napa, Supreme Court of California,
decided March 6, 1995, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 889 P.2d 1019, 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 ............................... 1461
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VI. Insurance Contracts and Coverage
Former Insurance Code section 11580.2(i) governing
uninsured and underinsured motorist claims is inap-
plicable to underinsured motorist coverage since it
directly conflicts with section 11580.2 (3); therefore
an insured need not comply with the conditions pre-
cedent in former section 11580.2(i) before filing an
underinsured motorist claim.
Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co., California Supreme
Court, decided December 6, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th 1049, 906
P.2d 1057, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 .................... 1462
VII. Lewdness, Indecency, and Obscenity
Any type of touching is sufficient to constitute forc-
ible lewd conduct, the touching need not be inherent-
ly lewd.
People v. Martinez, Supreme Court of California, decided
November 2, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th 434, 903 P. 2d 1037, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d 905 ............................... 1463
VIII. Parent and Child
Family Code section 7895 requires the court to ap-
point counsel for appellant parents after a judgment
freeing the child from parental custody or control,
but not for the respondent parent; however, the
court has discretion to appoint counsel for any re-
spondent parent when the termination of parental
rights is at stake.
In re Bryce, Supreme Court of California, decided De-
cember 26, 1995, 12 Cal. 4th 226, 906 P.2d 1275, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 120 ................................ 1464
IX. Public Utilities
California Public Utility Code section 453.5 prevents
the Public Utilities Commission from assessing a rate
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for a purpose other than to reimburse ratepayers.
Assembly of the State of California v. Public Utilities
Commission, Supreme Court of California, decided De-
cember 18, 1996, 12 Cal 4th 87, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54. ... 1465
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I. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Criminal defendants have standing to object to a
witness' involuntary custodial statements if it is
alleged such a violation actually taints that witness'
trial testimony; however, criminal defendants have
the burden of proving such coercion actually affect-
ed the reliability of the testimony received at trial:
People v. Badgett.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Badgett,' the California Supreme Court granted review to
delineate the extent to which criminal defendants can suppress the fruits
of involuntary pretrial statements of third parties'. While the court held
1. 10 Cal. 4th 330, 895 P.2d 877, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635 (1995). Chief Justice Lucas
delivered the opinion of the court, with Justices Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, George,
and Werdegar joining. Id. at 330-66, 895 P.2d at 877-98, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635-57.
Justice Mosk wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 366-67, 895 P.2d at
899, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657-58 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. Id. at 342-363, 895 P.2d at 883-96, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640-55. In February 1989,
a human head with a bullet wound washed ashore on a Santa Cruz County beach.
People v. Badgett, 34 Cal. App. 4th 903, 907, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152, 154- (Cal. Ct. App.
1994), vacated, 10 Cal. 4th 330, 895 P.2d 877, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635 (1995). Days later,
two hands and two feet washed ashore and a human torso was discovered down a
steep incline near a highway. Id. at 907, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154. Several months
later, officials used fingerprints to identify the body as that of Michael Palmer. Id.
The evening Palmer disappeared, codefendant Chris Badgett told Henrietta Jasik, his
17-year-old live-in girlfriend, he wanted to "off" Palmer, but he was not sure that his
brother John "would go along with it." Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 339, 895 P.2d at 881,
41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639. That evening, Chris Badgett told Jasik and two of their
roommates that he was going to surprise Palmer with a bus ticket so Palmer could
return to Texas to see his wife. Id. Upon returning home late that night, Chris
Badgett told Jasik that Palmer was on a bus to Texas and would call in three days.
Id. at 340, 895 P.2d at 881, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639. A day later, however, Chris
Badgett told Jasik that he and his brother had driven Palmer into the mountains,
shot and killed him, dismembered his body, and disposed of his remains by throwing
them into the ocean. Id. After identifying Palmer's body, police questioned the
Badgett brothers and Jasik because the three had used falsified documents with the
same home address in their applications for drivers' licenses in Santa Clara County.
Id. at 339, 895 P.2d at 881, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639. Police detained Jasik at a Santa
Cruz County juvenile facility for submitting a false driver's license application. Id. at
33940, 895 P.2d at 881, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639-40. While there, she described to
police officers her conversation with Chris Badgett in which he described killing
Palmer. Id. at 340, 895 P.2d at 881, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640. Although Jasik told the
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that criminal defendants have standing to suppress the fruits of such evi-
dence when it is alleged that coercion from those violations actually
taints a witness' trial testimony,3 it found, after an extensive examination
of the entire trial record, that the defendants did not meet their burden
of proving that extrajudicial violations actually interfered with their due
process rights to a fair trial.4
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Standing to Exclude Fruits of Coerced Third-party Testimony
In considering whether the defendants had standing to suppress Jasik's
testimony following her involuntary statements,5 the court stated that
any basis for the exclusion of evidence must rest upon one of the
defendants' personal constitutional rights.6 The court reaffumed that
criminal defendants do not have standing to object to evidence admitted
officers that she and John Badgett had thrown the gun used to kill Palmer off the
Golden Gate Bridge, she did not tell them about Chris Badgett's statement before
Palmer's death that he intended to kill him. Id.
At the brothers' trial, Jasik supplied primary prosecution evidence when she
testified under a grant of immunity. Id. at 341, 895 P.2d at 882, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
640. Chris Badgett moved to exclude Jasik's testimony on the ground of privileged
marital communication. Id. The trial court denied this motion on the ground that the
two could not establish a common-law marriage under Texas law. Id. Both defen-
dants moved to exclude Jasik's trial testimony, asserting that her pretrial statements
to police officers were the involuntary product of an illegal arrest. Id. The defendants
also alleged that Jasik's trial testimony was tainted by a coercive immunity agreement
that would require her to testify consistently with her previous involuntary state-
ments. Id. The trial court denied their motion for lack of standing but allowed the
defense to argue to the jury that her testimony should be discounted because of the
immunity agreement. Id. at 34142, 895 P.2d at 882, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640-41.
The jury convicted Chris and John Badgett of first-degree murder and conspiracy
to commit murder, and the court sentenced both to 25 years to life in state prison.
Id. at 339, 895 P.2d at 880-81, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639. The court of appeal reversed
on grounds that the defendants had standing to object to both Jasik's pretrial state-
ments and her trial testimony and that the trial court's failure to hold a hearing on
the motion in limine warranted reversal. Id. at 342, 350, 895 P.2d at 882, 888, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641, 646. The court of appeal also held that the marital communica-
tions privilege protected Chris Badgett's statements to Jasik. Id. at 342, 895 P.2d at
882, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641.
3. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 345, 895 P.2d at 884, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643. See gen-
erally 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 633 (1994) (describing the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine).
4. Id. at 363, 895 P.2d at 896, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654-55.
5. Id. at 34245, 895 P.2d at 883-85, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64143.
6. Id. at 344, 895 P.2d at 884, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642 (quoting People v. Douglas,
50 Cal. 3d 468, 501, 788 P.2d 640, 656, 268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 142 (1990)).
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in violation of another's Fourth,7 Fifth,8 or Sixth Amendment' rights un-
less they can show that such evidence violated the defendants' own due
process right to a fair trial.'" Because the defendants alleged in their
motion that the witness' coercive immunity agreement could require her
to testify consistently with her involuntary pretrial statements, the court
held that the defendants had standing to suppress."
7. Id. at 343, 895 P.2d at 883, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642; see United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) (contending that an interest in deterring illegal
searches does not justify exclusion of tainted evidence to parties not victims of an
illegal search); In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 896, 694 P.2d 744, 759, 210 Cal. Rptr.
631, 646, (1985) (concluding courts may exclude evidence only as mandated by the
federal exclusionary rule), clarified by People v. Neer, 177 Cal. App. 3d 991, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). See generally Arnold H.
Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitu-
tionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV.
907 (1989) (analyzing the Supreme Court rationale for excluding evidence); Eulis
Simien, Jr., The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Stand-
ing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 ARK. L. REV. 487 (1988) (reviewing the
Supreme Court's narrowing of the standing doctrine); 4 WITEIN & EPSTEIN, CALMFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAW Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence §§ 2276-2278 (1989 & Supp.
1995) (discussing standing for Fourth Amendment violations); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Crim-
inal Law § 3181 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (discussing standing for suppression of illegally
obtained evidence).
8. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 343, 895 P.2d at 883, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642; see Doug-
las, 50 Cal. 3d at 501, 788 P.2d at 656, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 142 (finding no standing to
suppress statements made by co-conspirator). For inconsistent policy viewpoints on
excluding evidence from Fifth Amendment violations, compare Akhil Reed Amar &
Rende B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Se(f-Incrimination Clause,
93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995) (proposing that coerced confessions are excluded be-
cause they are unreliable), with Yale Kamisar, Response, On the "Fruits" of Miranda
Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929
(1995) (emphasizing offensive police conduct as the primary purpose for excluding
involuntary confessions).
9. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 343-44, 895 P.2d at 884, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642; see
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-21 (1975) (reasoning the right to counsel is a
personal right); People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 812-13, 427 P.2d 772, 776, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 108, 112 (1967) (stating right to counsel cannot be asserted vicariously). See
generally James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Pre-
mises and Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. REV. 751 (1989) (suggesting that few of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules should apply to the Sixth Amend-
ment).
10. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 344, 895 P.2d at 884, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64243. See
generally Scott D. Mroz, Comment, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule: A Fifth
Amendment Approach to the Regulation of Intentional Governmental Misconduct, 17
U.S.F. L REV. 277 (1983) (discussing the due process rationales behind the
exclusionary rule).
11. Badgett, 10 Cal 4th at 345, 895 P.2d at 884, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643. The court
1403
2. Policy and Burdens of Excluding Coerced Third-party Testimony
The court examined constitutional policy to distinguish between ex-
cluding fruits following the violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights and those following the involuntary statements of a witness. 2 The
court reasoned that the exclusionary rule exists in the first instance so
as to prevent criminal defendants from being compelled to aid the state
in their conviction, 3 where the policy of excluding evidence tainted by
the involuntary statements of third parties is limited to assuring reliabili-
ty of the evidence admitted at trial. 4 The court further reasoned that
because the danger of compelling defendants to participate in their con-
viction was absent in the latter situation and, therefore, the state's evi-
dentiary burden would not be lightened, 6 courts must determine, rather
than assume, that trial testimony was tainted by ongoing coercion from
an earlier violation. 7
The court also delineated the different evidentiary burdens applicable
to defendants' motions to exclude.'" While the prosecution has the bur-
den of proving that a criminal defendant's confessions comported with
the Fifth Amendment, 9 the court stated that when contesting the fruits
rejected the state's argument that the defendants moved to suppress Jasik's trial testi-
mony solely because it was the fruit of an earlier coerced statement. Id.
12. Id. at 346-50, 895 P.2d at 885-88, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-46.
13. Id. at 346, 895 P.2d at 885-86, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644; see Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) ("[O]ur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that
the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by
its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling
it from his own mouth.").
14. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 347, 895 P.2d at 886, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 347-48, 895 P.2d at 886, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644-45. The defendants relied
on In re J. Clyde K, 192 Cal. App. 3d 710, 237 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1987), which held
that "[tihe constitutionally mandated exclusion of a coerced confession and of evi-
dence obtained as a result of that unlawfully obtained confession is equally applicable
when the introduction of the same evidence is sought at the trial of another." Id. at
718, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 554. The court reasoned that the exclusion of another's coerced
confession and its fruits was "essential" to protecting the defendant's due process
rights. Id.
The supreme court distinguished the two cases, reasoning that rather than at-
tempting to exclude a witness' extrajudicial statement introduced at trial, Badgett
involved excluding a witness' in-court testimony. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 349, 895 P.2d
at 887, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646. Thus, the court ruled that unless criminal defendants
can prove exclusion is necessary to prevent the use of unreliable evidence, they
should not be able to assert the Filth Amendment rights of others. Id. at 349, 895
P.2d at 888, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646.
18. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 348, 895 P.2d at 886-87, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645.
19. Id. "The burden is on the People to demonstrate the voluntariness of a
defendant's admissions or confessions by a preponderance of the evidence. Similarly,
1404
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of third-party involuntary statements, defendants have the burden of
showing that lingering coercion actually tainted the witness' trial testi-
mony.
20
3. Determination of Coercion in Henrietta Jasik's Testimony
Because the court of appeal did not determine whether the witness'
trial testimony was actually unreliable,2' the supreme court employed an
independent standard of review, examining the entire record to deter-
mine whether the defendants' due process rights were actually in-
fringed.
2 2
The defendants first contended that because Jasik was detained in
violation of Penal Code section 830.1' and Welfare and Institutions
Code section 626,24 her extrajudicial statements and in-court testimony
it falls to the People to demonstrate, in the case of successive confessions or
statements, that the 'taint' of a first, involuntary statement has been attenuated." Id.
(citations omitted); see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1971) (stating federal
Constitution requires preponderance standard); People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 71,
775 P.2d 1042, 1047, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 (1989) (finding legislative intent in enact-
ing article 1, section 28(d) of the California Constitution was to curtail the reasonable
doubt standard to a preponderance standard); People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 843,
647 P.2d 93, 109, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 833 (1982) (prosecution has burden of rebutting
presumption that a subsequent confession is the product of a prior involuntary con-
fession).
20. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 348, 895 P.2d at 886-87, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645.
21. Id. at 351, 895 P.2d at 888, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
22. Id. at 350, 895 P.2d at 888, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646. The court recognized that
it had not set forth a standard of review with regard to use of coerced testimony of
third parties at trial. Id. Despite the fact that the trial court refused to hear the mo-
tion in limine for lack of standing, and because the defendants made an argument
to the jury about the witness' testimony, the court determined that the parties had a
full opportunity to litigate the issue of witness coercion and the trial court's failure
to hold an evidentiary hearing was, therefore, harmiess error. Id. at 351-52, 895 P.2d
at 889, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647.
23. Penal Code § 830.1 provides, in relevant part, that peace officers have authori-
ty "[a]s to any public offense committed or which there is probable cause to believe
has been committed within the political subdivision which employs the peace offi-
cer." CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1 (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). The defendants
contended that because Jasik submitted false documents in order to obtain a driver's
license in Santa Clara County, she should not have been arrested by Santa Cruz
County peace officers. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 340, 895 P.2d at 881-82, 41 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 640.
24. Welfare and Institutions Code § 626 requires a peace officer who takes a juve-
nile into temporary custody to release the minor to the probation officer of the coun-
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were the tainted fruit of an unlawful arrest.2 The court disagreed, rea-
soning that such "technical violations" had no coercive impact on either
her statements to the police or her in-court testimony.26 The defendants
next alleged that Jasik's statements to police were involuntary because
they were made after an offer of leniency, and thus became a "script" for
her trial testimony.27 The court dismissed this argument, noting that it
has upheld offers of leniency in return for cooperation with the police,
so long as the witness testifies truthfully.28
The defendants further contended that unethical conduct by the pros-
ecutor resulted in Jasik's unrepresention by counsel, and that this in turn
tainted the testimony she gave at trial.29 The court disagreed, ruling that
there was no requirement that an immunized witness be provided with
counsel in order to protect a defendant's right to due process.' Finally,
the defendants argued that the immunity agreement Jasik signed required
her to testify consistently with her prior involuntary statements to the
police." Although the court held that such an agreement would violate a
defendant's right to due process,32 the court determined that the actual
immunity agreement used at the defendants' trial had no consistency re-
quirement.' The court stated that while immunity agreements inherently
ty in which the minor was taken into custody. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 626(d)
(West Supp. 1996). Jasik was not released to a probation officer, rather, she re-
mained at a Santa Cruz juvenile detention facility before she was released pursuant
to an immunity agreement. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 340, 895 P.2d at 881-82, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 640.
25. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 352-53, 895 P.2d at 889-90, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648.
26. Id. at 353-54, 895 P.2d at 890, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648-49. The court doubted
such minor violations could taint her trial testimony when she had been released to
her mother's supervision for three months before trial. Id. at 353, 895 P.2d at 890, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649.
27. Id. at 354, 895 P.2d at 890, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649.
28. Id. at 354-55, 895 P.2d at 891, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649; see People v. Daniels,
52 Cal. 3d 815, 802 P.2d 906, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1991) (holding it not improper to
confront suspects with offers of leniency in exchange for cooperation with police);
People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986) (granting
immunity for prosecution witnesses does not violate defendant's right to a fair trial
so long as witness testifies truthfully).
29. Id. at 355, 895 P.2d at 891-92, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.
30. Id. at 357, 895 P.2d at 893, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 358, 895 P.2d at 893, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651; see People v. Allen, 42
Cal. 3d 1222, 1251, 729 P.2d 115, 130, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 864 (1986) (defendant de-
nied a fair trial if prosecution coerces witnesses to testify in a specific manner). See
generally Rita W. Gordon, Right to Immunity for Defense Witnesses, 20 CONN. L.
REV. 153 (1987); 1 WITuIN & EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW Defenses § 380 (1988
& Supp. 1995) (discussing immunity as a defense); 20 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§
2292-2297 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (discussing immunity generally and distinguishing use
immunity from transactional immunity).
33. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th at 358, 895 P.2d at 893, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652. Adding
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contain some element of coercion, those requiring only that a witness
testify "fully and truthfully" are valid.' After dismissing each of the
defendants' claims, the court held that the defendants failed to show a
violation of their due process rights because they could not prove Jasik's
actual trial testimony suffered from any lingering coercion. 5
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Although Justice Mosk agreed with the majority that a criminal defen-
dant has standing to exclude unreliable fruits of third-party involuntary
statements,' he found that the trial court committed more than harm-
less error in not ruling on the merits of the defendants' motion in limi-
ne." He reasoned that reviewing courts could not determine whether
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of an ex-
press or implied ruling on the motion by the trial court.' Although Jus-
tice Mosk stated the trial court partially cured its error by ruling on the
significant confusion to the issue was the fact that Jasik had testified under two
different immunity agreements, the first being at her juvenile court detention hearing
and the second being at defendants' trial. Id. at 358, 895 P.2d at 893, 41 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 651. While the court did find some mention of consistent testimony in the
immunity agreement used at her juvenile proceeding, it could not find a similar con-
dition in the immunity agreement used at defendants' trial. Id. at 358-59, 895 P.2d at
893-94, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652. The court emphasized that on her cross-examination,
Jasik denied that she had been told to testify in a particular manner or to lie. Id. at
361, 895 P.2d at 895, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653. She also testified that she did not be-
lieve that her immunity agreement was conditioned upon her testimony being consis-
tent with her earlier statements to the police. Id. In fact, as the court illustrated,
Jasik's testimony at trial actually differed from her previous statements to the police
because she described Chris Badgett's conversation prior to Palmer's disappearance in
which he stated that he intended to "off' Palmer. Id. at 362, 895 P.2d at 896, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 654.
34. Id. at 358, 895 P.2d at 893, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651-52.
35. Id. at 363, 895 P.2d at 896, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654-55.
36. Id. at 366, 895 P.2d at 899, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
37. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
38. Id. at 367, 895 P.2d at 899, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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immunity agreement after the trial,39 he would have remanded the case
to the trial court to determine the merits of the defendants' other three
claims.4"
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
In People v. Badgett, the California Supreme Court redefined the extent
to which criminal defendants can suppress the fruits of involuntary pre-
trial statements of third parties.4 ' It held that criminal defendants have
standing to object to a witness' involuntary custodial statements so long
as the defendants allege that such violations actually taint the witness'
trial testimony." While the court reaffirmed that defendants cannot ordi-
narily assert the constitutional rights of others,43 it held that they do
have standing when the fruits of others' constitutional violations would
affect the defendants' due process right to a fair trial.' With this right
comes a burden: criminal defendants must prove that a witness' trial
testimony was actually tainted by lingering coercion from an earlier vio-
lation.4" Because appellate courts may employ independent standards of
review4 to motions that were never actually determined on their mer-
its,4" this burden will indeed be difficult for defendants to bear.
JONATHAN SIMONDS PYATT
39. Id. at 367, 895 P.2d at 899, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
40. Id. at 367, 895 P.2d at 899, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
41. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
42. Id. at 345, 895 P.2d at 884, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643.
43. Id. at 343-44, 895 P.2d at 883-84, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642.
44. Id. at 344, 895 P.2d at 888, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642.
45. Id. at 347-48, 895 P.2d at 886, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644-45.
46. Id. at 350, 895 P.2d at 888, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646-47.
47. Id. at 367, 895 P.2d at 899, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 657 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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B. Police may not base a temporary detention solely
upon a person's flight at the sight of police:
People v. Souza.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Souza,' the California Supreme Court determined whether
police may base a temporary detention solely upon a person's flight at
the sight of police.2 The court held that police may not temporarily de-
tain a person merely because the person fled upon seeing the officers.3
The court ruled, however, that police may consider flight as a key factor
in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to detain a person
temporarily.4
1. 9 Cal. 4th 224, 885 P.2d 982, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569 (1994). Justice Kennard
wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian, Baxter,
George, and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 22742, 885 P.2d at 983-93, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 570-80. Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 242-44, 885 P.2d
at 993-94, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580-81.
2. Id. at 229, 885 P.2d at 984, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571. In Souza, a police officer
was patrolling a high crime neighborhood when he saw the defendant and a woman
standing near a car that was parked close to an intersection where the officer re-
cently arrested two people. Id. at 228, 885 P.2d at 984, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571. Al-
though the area was very dark, it appeared to the officer that the defendant was
talking to someone in the parked car. Id.
Suspecting that the two people were involved in an automobile burglary, the
officer pulled up behind the parked car and shined the police car's spotlight into the
parked car. Id. At that point, two people who were sitting in the front seat ducked,
and the defendant ran away. Id. "The officer stopped the defendant and conducted a
cursory search for weapons," during which a plastic baggie of cocaine fell from the
defendant's clothes. Id.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the bag of cocaine from evidence,
claiming that the officer obtained it during an unlawful detention. Id. at 227-28, 885
P.2d at 984, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571. The trial court denied the motion, concluding
that the defendant's flight gave the officer reasonable cause for suspicion. Id. at 228,
885 P.2d at 984, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571. Consequently, the defendant pled "guilty to
possession of cocaine for sale." Id. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the bag
of cocaine was the fruit of an illegal detention due to a lack of reasonable suspicion.
Id. Unlike the trial court, the court of appeal gave little weight to the defendant's
flight from the officer as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion. Id. at 228-29, 885
P.2d at 984, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571.
3. Id. at 227, 885 P.2d at 983, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570.
4. Id.
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II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 13 of the California Constitution protects individuals from unrea-
sonable seizure.' A seizure occurs when police restrain a person's liberty
"'by means of physical force or show of authority.'"' Thus, a seizure oc-
curs when police temporarily detain a person for investigation.7
Under both the United States and California Constitutions, a seizure is
unreasonable when it is based on insufficient grounds.8 To have suffi-
cient grounds for temporary detentions, the police must have a reason-
able suspicion that "the person detained may be involved in criminal
activity."9 Police must consider the "totality of the circumstances"-all
5. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unrea-
sonable seizures . . . shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend IV; see also CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 13 (West 1995) (granting similar protection). See generally 20 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2505 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (discussing general constitutional
standards that apply to California search and seizure jurisprudence).
6. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 229, 885 P.2d at 985, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572 (quoting
Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). See generally 4 B.E. WIrHN & NORMAN L.
EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence § 2361
(2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) ("A person is seized whenever an officer accosts him and
restrains his freedom to walk away . . ").
7. See generally 20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2540 (1985 & Supp. 1995) ("The
Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures that involve only a brief deten-
tion short of traditional arrest.").
8. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 11 ("The heart of the Fourth Amendment ... is a se-
vere requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon protected personal
security . . ").
9. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 231, 885 P.2d at 986, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573. See general-
ly 4 B.E. WrrINN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Exclusion of Ille-
gally Obtained Evidence § 2361 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing reasonable
suspicion). "There is ... a right to stop . . . 'where a police officer observes unusu-
al conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot ..... '" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 30).
In contrast, police must have probable cause to arrest a person. See Souza, 9
Cal. 4th at 230, 885 P.2d at 985, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572. Probable cause exists when
a reasonable person in the shoes of the arresting officer would believe that an indi-
vidual has committed or is committing an offense. Id. The probable cause standard is
more demanding than the reasonable suspicion standard. See generally 4 B.E. WrrIN
& NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evi-
dence § 2366 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the standards of probable cause
and reasonable suspicion); Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The
Concepts of "Stop" and "Arrest," 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1982) (discussing Fourth
Amendment seizures and distinguishing between stops and arrests). "'[Cjircumstances
short of probable cause to make an arrest may still justify an officer's stopping pe-
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existing factors-to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists.'0
In the instant case, the court of appeal found that the officer lacked
reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain the defendant." The court of
appeal relied on People v. Aldridge,2 which held that "detention involv-
ing flight was valid only when flight was an additional factor to confirm
other evidence of the defendant's involvement in criminal activity."'3 Ac-
cordingly, noting the lack of other evidence implicating the defendant in
criminal activity, the court of appeal gave little weight to the defendant's
flight from the officer."
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal.'5 Accord-
ing to the supreme court, the court of appeal erroneously relied on
Aldridge, which involved a pre-Proposition 8 detention. 6 The instant
case, the court pointed out, involved a post-Proposition 8 detention. 7
The court explained that Proposition 8 made the United States Con-
stitution the controlling body of law in California search and seizure
jurisprudence.'" Although state constitutional principles controlled prior
to its enactment, Proposition 8 now requires California courts to exclude
illegally seized evidence only when the United States Constitution re-
quires such exclusion.'9
destrians or motorists on the streets for questioning.'" 4 B.E. WrrGN & NORMAN L.
EPSTEIN, CAUFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence § 2366
(2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1995) (quoting People v. Mickleson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 450, 380
P.2d 658, 659, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 19 (1963)).
10. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 230, 885 P.2d at 985, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572 (citing Unit-
ed States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).
11. Id. at 228, 885 P.2d at 984, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571.
12. 35 Cal. 3d 473, 674 P.2d 240, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1984).
13. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 229, 885 P.2d at 984, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571 (citing
Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d at 479, 674 P.2d at 242-43, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 541). "'Under differ-
ent circumstances .. . flight might imply a consciousness of guilt, and combined with
other objective factors could justify an investigative stop.'" Id. at 231-32, 885 P.2d at
986, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d at 479,
674 P.2d at 243, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 541).
14. Id. at 229, 885 P.2d at 984, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571.
15. Id. at 242, 885 P.2d at 993, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580.
16. Id. at 232, 885 P.2d at 987, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574. The court pointed out that
the detention in Aldridge occurred before the enactment of Proposition 8, even
though the Aldridge court issued its decision after the enactment of Proposition 8.
Id.
17. Id. at 232-33, 885 P.2d at 987, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 890, 694 P.2d 744, 755, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 631, 642 (1985)). "[S]ection 28(d) was intended to permit exclusion of relevant,
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Having determined the applicable body of law, the court next ad-
dressed the arguments of the Attorney General.2" The Attorney General
argued that: (1) a person's flight from police should be relevant to de-
termining reasonable suspicion, even though the person may have an
innocent explanation for the flight,2' and (2) a person's flight at the
sight of police should, by itself, provide sufficient basis for reasonable
suspicion. ' The court accepted the Attorney General's first argument,
but rejected the second.'
1. Flight from Police Is Relevant in Determining Reasonable
Suspicion
The court stated that there are instances when a person's conduct is
consistent with both innocent and criminal behavior.24 It is the duty of
police, according to the court, to investigate such conduct in order to
"establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal."25 Since police
but unlawfully obtained evidence, only if exclusion is required by the United States
Constitution .. ." Id. "Section 28(d)" refers to Article I, Section 28(d) of the Cali-
fornia Constitution, which constitutes the Proposition 8 amendment. See CAL CONST.
art. I, § 28(d) ("[Rlelevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceed-
ing . . . ."); Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 891, 694 P.2d at 755, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 642
("[Slection 28(d) was properly adopted through the amendment procedure .... "). See
generally 7 B.E. WITaIN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNIA LAw, Constitutional Law § 410 (9th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995). "Proposition 8 abolished the independent grounds basis for
exclusion of evidence, leaving the [F]ederal Constitution as interpreted by controlling
federal decisions as the sole basis for exclusion." Id. (citation omitted).
20. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 233-39, 885 P.2d at 987-91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574-78.
21. Id. at 233, 885 P.2d at 987, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574. The Attorney General
wanted the court "to adopt a 'bright-line' rule" that authorizes police to temporarily
detain a person whenever the person flees at the sight of police or police vehicles.
Id. at 235, 885 P.2d at 988, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 233-39, 885 P.2d at 987-91, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574-78.
24. Id. at 233, 885 P.2d at 987, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574 (citing In re Tony C., 21
Cal. 3d 888, 893, 582 P.2d 957, 959, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (1978), correction notice
at 697 P.2d 311, 212 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1985). The court in In re Tony C. noted that
"'where events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity,'" a
detention will not be automatically unlawful. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d at 893-94, 582
P.2d at 959-60, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69 (overruling as dictum Irwin v. Superior Court,
1 Cal. 3d 423, 427, 462 P.2d 12, 14, 82 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486 (1969)), superseded by
constitutional amendment as stated in In re Christopher B., 219 Cal. App. 3d 455,
460 n.2, 268 Cal. Rptr. 8, 11 n.2 (1990).
25. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 233, 885 P.2d at 987, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574 (quoting In
re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d at 894, 582 P.2d at 960, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 369). See generally
42 CAL JUR. 3D Law Eqforcement Officers § 55 (1978 & Supp. 1995) ("Peace officers
generally are charged with the duty of prevention and detection of crime. They are
thus required to investigate . . . any suspicious circumstances, such as would indicate
to a reasonable man in like position that such a course is necessary in the discharge
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cannot effectively investigate a person's conduct without temporarily de-
taining the person, the court ruled that conduct that is consistent with
both innocent and criminal behavior may support a determination of rea-
sonable suspicion.26
Accordingly, the court held that a person's flight from police supports
a determination of reasonable suspicion.2" The court reasoned that flight
is equally consistent with innocent behavior as it is with criminal behav-
ior because every person is "free to avoid contact with a police offi-
cer."2' Thus, police should be able to temporarily detain the person, in
order to investigate and determine whether the person's flight is innocent
or criminal.'
At the same time, the court ruled that the "manner in which a person
avoids police contact" is relevant to determining reasonable suspicion.'
According to the court, a person's flight at the sight of police is a stron-
ger factor than a person's refusal to answer a police officer's ques-
tions.2 ' The court reasoned that the former manifests a person's "unwill-
ingness to be observed and possibly identified" and thus, indicates a
"consciousness of guilt."32
of the officer's duty.").
26. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th 233, 885 P.2d at 987, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574. "'The possi-
bility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to en-
tertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.'" Id. (quoting In re Tony C., 21
Cal. 3d at 894, 582 P.2d at 960, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 369)
27. Id. at 235, 885 P.2d at 988, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.
28. Id. at 234, 885 P.2d at 988, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575 (citing People v. Bower, 24
Cal. 3d 638, 648, 597 P.2d 115, 121, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856, 862 (1979), superseded by
constitutional amendment as stated in People v. Lloyd, 4 Cal. App. 4th 724, 733, 6
Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 109 (1992)). "[A] person approached by police . . . 'need not an-
swer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all
and may go on his way.'" Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983));
see Bower, 24 Cal. 3d at 648, 597 P.2d at 121, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 862 ("In our society,
private individuals are free to conduct their own lives, seeking to mingle with or to
avoid whomever they please .... Lacking . . . [adequate] basis, an officer may not
detain an individual, and the individual ... is as free to avoid the officer as to
avoid any other person."); see also Rachel A. Van Cleave, Note, Michigan v.
Chesternut and Investigative Pursuits: Is There No End to the War Between the
Constitution and Common Sense?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 203, 228 (1988) ("In order to
make a citizen's right to ignore officials meaningful, a seizure based solely on a
citizen's attempt to avoid an officer should not be permitted.").
29. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 235, 885 P.2d at 988, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.
30. Id. at 234-35, 885 P.2d at 988, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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2. A Person's Flight at the Sight of Police Cannot, by Itself, Provide
Sufficient Basis for Reasonable Suspicion
Although the court found that a person's flight at the sight of police
supports a finding of reasonable suspicion, the court rejected the Attor-
ney General's argument that flight by itself provides sufficient basis for
reasonable suspicion.' The court reasoned that the Attorney General's
argument contradicts the United States Supreme Court's mandate that
police should consider the totality of the circumstances, not just one
factor, in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.'
In support of his argument, the Attorney General cited several author-
ities that allow courts and juries to infer guilt from a person's flight from
police.35 The court pointed out, however, that these authorities address
situations where flight is not the only evidence of criminality.' Thus,
the court stated that it did not support the Attorney General's argument. 7
33. Id. at 235, 885 P.2d at 988-89, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575-76. See generally Albert
W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prwr. L. REV. 227
(1994) (arguing against the adoption of categorical rules applicable to all Fourth
Amendment situations because such rules "often lead to substantial injustice" and
because "their artificiality commonly makes them difficult to apply").
34. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 235, 885 P.2d at 988-89, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575-76 (citing
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). "[Tlhe totality of the circumstanc-
es-the whole picture-must be taken into account." Id. (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at
417).
35. Id. at 235, 885 P.2d at 989, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 576. The Attorney General cited
four authorities: (1) Section 1127(c) of the California Penal Code, (2) the California
Jury Instructions, (3) Alberty v. United States, and (4) Allen v. United States. Id.; see
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127(c) (West 1992 & Supp 1995) ("The flight of a person imme-
diately after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime that has
been committed ... is a fact . . . the jury may consider in deciding his guilt or
innocence."); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL (CAIJIC) No. 2.52 (5th ed.
1988) (same); Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 510 (1896) ("[U]ndoubtedly, the
flight of an accused is a circumstance proper to be laid before the jury, as having a
tendency to prove his guilt . . . ."); Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 499 (1896)
("'[Tihe wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion.'"
(quoting Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 422 (1896))); see also 20 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 3159 (1985 & Supp. 1995) ("The flight of the accused after the com-
mission of a crime . . . is a factor tending to connect the accused with the commis-
sion of the offense and to show consciousness of guilt.").
36. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 235-36, 885 P.2d at 989, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 576. Referring
to such situations as "flight plus," the court pointed out that these cases involve a
defendant who flees "from a crime scene or after being accused of a crime." Id.
37. The Attorney General cited seven additional cases from other jurisdictions to
support his argument. Id. at 236, 885 P.2d at 989, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 576. The court
stated that there were "other indicia of criminal activity" aside from the flight in five
of the seven cases. Id. Further, the court found the other two cases unpersuasive,
even though both held that flight by itself provides sufficient basis for reasonable
suspicion. Id. at 236-37, 885 P.2d at 989-90, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 576-77 (rejecting Platt
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In short, the court reaffirmed the totality of the circumstances ap-
proach to determining reasonable suspicion.' The court stated that po-
lice must consider all existing factors, including "[tiime, locality, lighting
conditions, and an area's reputation for criminal activity," when they
determine whether reasonable suspicion exists to temporarily detain
someone.
Applying these principles to the instant case, the court held that the
police officer had reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain the defen-
dant4 ° The court reasoned that the totality of the circumstances, includ-
ing the defendant's flight, could lead a police officer to reasonably sus-
pect that the defendant was involved in criminal activity.4 Specifically,
the court pointed to the area's reputation for criminal activity,42 the two
people standing near a parked car in total darkness at three in the morn-
ing,43 the two people in the car immediately bending down when the
police officer shined the spotlight, and the defendant's flight from the
police officer.'
v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1992), and State v. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis.
1990)).
38. Id. at 239, 885 P.2d at 991, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578. The court noted that the
United States Supreme Court recently refused to deviate from its totality of the cir-
cumstances approach to seizure cases. Id. at 238-39, 885 P.2d at 990-91, 36 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 577-78 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989), and Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1988)).
39. Id. at 239, 885 P.2d at 991, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578. The court asserted that
there is "no single fact," not even a person's flight from police, that indicates in
every instance that a person is involved in criminal activity. Id.
40. Id. at 240, 885 P.2d at 993, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579.
41. Id. The court stated that the evidence should be viewed from the practical
standpoint of a police officer, not from the academic standpoint of scholars. Id. at
240, 885 P.2d at 992, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579 (involving use of footprints to justify
detention).
42. Id. at 240-41, 885 P.2d at 992, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579. The court noted that a
locale's reputation for unlawful activity is a relevant factor in determining reasonable
suspicion. Id. (citing People v. Nonnette, 221 Cal. App. 3d 659, 668, 271 Cal. Rptr.
329, 334 (1990)).
43. Id. at 241, 885 P.2d at 992-93, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579-80. "'Three am .... is
both a late and an unusual hour for anyone to be in attendance at an outdoor social
gathering . . . .'" Id. (quoting People v. Holloway, 176 Cal. App. 3d 150, 155, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 394, 396 (1986)). The court also noted that "more than 70 percent of thefts
involving motor vehicles take place between 6 p.m. and 6 am., and the majority of
these occur after midnight" Id. at 241, 885 P.2d at 993, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580 (cit-
ing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS-1991 263 (1991)).
44. Id. at 241, 885 P.2d at 993, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580. The court noted that the
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B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority's disposition of the case but
disagreed on one issue.4" Justice Mosk argued that a person's flight at
the sight of police should not, as the majority contended, be more suspi-
cious than a person's refusal to answer a police officer's questions.46
Justice Mosk reasoned that a person may avoid the police for innocent
reasons, just as the majority pointed out.47 According to Justice Mosk,
the manner in which a person avoids the police is immaterial because a
person will likely run, instead of walk, away from "police [who] are
known to pursue those who decline to allow themselves to be voluntarily
detained."4"
Similarly, Justice Mosk stated that minorities who have been victims of
police harassment might innocently "flee at the first sight of police in
order to avoid an encounter that their experience has taught them might
be troublesome."49 Therefore, Justice Mosk asserted that flight at the
sight of police is just another factor, no stronger than other factors, that
police should consider when determining reasonable suspicion.'
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently upheld an investigatory stop based
on similar facts. Id. at 241-42, 885 P.2d at 993, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580 (citing Com-
monwealth v. Moses, 557 N.E.2d 14, 16-17 (Mass. 1990)). In Moses, a police officer
was patrolling a high crime area when he "saw four . . . men standing near an auto-
mobile parked next to the sidewalk with its motor running." Moses, 557 N.E.2d at 15,
17. The men seemed to be interacting with the three men in the automobile. Id. at
17. Upon seeing the police officer, the four men quickly dispersed, and one of the
men sitting in the car "immediately ducked under the dashboard." Id.
45. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 242, 885 P.2d at 993, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
46. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 243, 885 P.2d at 993-94, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580-81 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
48. Id. at 243, 885 P.2d at 994, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581 (Mosk, J., concurring); see,
e.g., People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d 473, 476, 674 P.2d 240, 241, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538,
539 (1984) (involving a police officer who routinely detained every person at the
parking lot of a certain liquor store). The Aldridge court stated that the defendant
"knew what was in store for him if he were to remain," and thus "had every right to
avoid such persistent harassment." Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d at 479, 674 P.2d at 243, 198
Cal. Rptr. at 541.
49. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 243, 885 P.2d at 993-94, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580-81 (Mosk,
J., concurring). Justice Mosk noted that these people wrongly view the police "more
as sources of harassment than of protection." Id. at 243, 885 P.2d at 994, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 581 (Mosk, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 24244, 885 P.2d at 993-94, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580-81 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
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IV. IMPACT & CONCLUSION
Prior to June 1982, the California Constitution was the controlling
body of law in California search and seizure cases." To justify a tempo-
rary detention under the California Constitution, the California Supreme
Court had held that there must be "specific and articulable facts causing
[a police officer] to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has
taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he
intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity."52
In June 1982, however, the enactment of Proposition 8 made the Unit-
ed States Constitution the controlling body of law in California search
and seizure cases.' Consequently, United States Supreme Court search
and seizure cases also became controlling. Thus, United States v. Cortez
became the controlling authority in California.' In Cortez, the United
States Supreme Court held that a police officer must consider the totality
of the circumstances in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists
to justify a temporary detention."
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court in People v. Souza applied
the totality of the circumstances test and held that a person's flight at
the sight of police cannot, by itself, justify a temporary detention.' In-
stead, flight is merely one circumstance that may support a finding of
reasonable suspicion. 7
The California Supreme Court's decision in Souza impacts law enforce-
ment practices throughout the state. The decision prohibits police from
temporarily detaining a person merely because the person ran away upon
seeing the police.' Instead, police can constitutionally detain the person
51. See id. at 232-33, 885 P.2d at 987, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574.
52. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 893, 582 P.2d 957, 959, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368
(1978); see also Aldridge, 35 Cal. 3d at 478, 674 P.2d at 242, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 540
(applying two-part test of In re Tony C., and holding that the factors of nighttime, a
site of frequent drug transactions, and avoidance of police "[w]hether considered
separately or together, . . . do not justify [a] . . . detention.").
53. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 232, 885 P.2d at 987, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 574; see supra
note 19 and accompanying text
54. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
55. Id. at 417.
56. Souza, 9 Cal. 4th at 227, 885 P.2d at 983, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 227, 885 P.2d at 983, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570.
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only when there are other indicators of criminal activity aside from the
flight.5 9
The California Supreme Court's decision in Souza also impacts the
state's criminal courts. In handling temporary detention cases, the courts
must determine whether all existing factors, including a person's flight
from police, taken together would lead a police officer to reasonably
suspect that the person was involved in criminal activity.' The courts
must find unconstitutional any temporary detentions that are based sole-
ly on a person's flight from police.6
As a whole, the California Supreme Court's decision in Souza strikes a
balance between every police officer's duty to investigate potential crime,
and every person's right to be free from unreasonable seizures.'
ROBERT E. SABIDO
59. See id. at 239, 885 P.2d at 991, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578.
60. See id. at 240, 885 P.2d at 992, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580.
61. See id. at 227, 885 P.2d at 983, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570.
62. See Van Cleave, supra note 28, at 228 (arguing that the courts would not ham-
per police efforts to investigate if they required police to have "factors other than
flight or avoidance at sight" to temporarily detain a person).
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II. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
The voter initiative power is broader than the referen-
dum power and includes the ability to prospectively re-
peal a tax ordinance: Rossi v. Brown.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rossi v. Brown,' the California Supreme Court first considered
whether the voter initiative power can be used to accomplish an objec-
tive which is expressly excluded from the referendum power. In a four
to three decision, the court reversed the appellate court's ruling2 and
held that, because neither the San Francisco Charter nor the California
Constitution removes tax issues from initiative reach, and because the
impacts of the initiative and referendum powers are dissimilar, the initia-
tive power exceeds the referendum power and is a legitimate avenue by
which voters may prospectively repeal a tax ordinance.3
1. 9 Cal. 4th 688, 889 P.2d 557, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363 (1995). Justice Baxter draft-
ed the majority opinion in which Justices Kennard, Arabian and Werdegar concurred.
Id. at 693-716, 889 P.2d at 559-74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365-80. Justice Mosk wrote the
dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justice George. Id. at 716-37,
889 P.2d at 574-88, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380-94 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. In a unanimous decision, the court of appeal equated the initiative power with
the referendum power, which both the California Constitution and the San Francisco
City Charter expressly restrict from addressing any tax issue. Rossi v. Brown, 28 Cal.
App. 4th 1576, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384 (1993).
3. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 693, 889 P.2d at 559, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365. This appeal
arose over the 1982 enactment of an ordinance exempting residential utility consum-
ers from a San Francisco utility tax on water, steam, telephone, electricity and gas.
Id. The ordinance also contained a provision to reimpose the tax in the future, un-
less the San Francisco Board of Supervisors again voted to exempt residential users.
Id. at 693-94, 889 P.2d at 559, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365. When the Board failed to do
so, an initiative to repeal the tax on residential customers found its way to the ballot
and was adopted in November of 1987, effectively repealing the residential tax after
June of 1988. Id. Two taxpayers, Leo Rossi and Guiliano Darbe, sought to compel
the collection of the utility tax from residential users. Id. at 694, 889 P.2d at 560, 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. The trial court granted relief and the tax collector appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling and the California Supreme Court
granted review. Id.
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II. TREATMENT
A. Justice Baxter's Majority Opinion
1. The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum Powers
After a detailed account of the relevant facts,4 Justice Baxter exam-
ined the characteristics and breadth of the California initiative and refer-
endumn powers.' He first noted that they are powers reserved by the
electorate and must be ardently protected by the courts such that any
doubts surrounding these powers must be resolved in favor of their use.'
He then set forth the basics of the constitutional initiative power,7 and
found nothing that expressly precluded the use of initiatives to repeal
taxes.8 Next, Justice Baxter considered the effect of the city charter of
San Francisco, which reserves an expansive initiative power for the elec-
torate? He determined that the plain language of the constitution and
the charter initiative provisions supported the majority's contention that
the power may be used to repeal the utility tax ordinance."
Next, Justice Baxter assessed the referendum power under the Cali-
fornia Constitution and the San Francisco Charter and found express
limitations restricting referenda use with respect to taxation issues."
4. See supra note 3.
5. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 695-97, 889 P.2d at 560-62, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366-68. For
a comparison of the referendum and initiative powers, see David B. Magleby, Let the
Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO.
L. REv. 13 (1995).
6. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 695, 889 P.2d at 560, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. See Stephen
H. Sutro, Interpretation of Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Canons of
Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 945,
946 (1994) ("[Clourts do their best to 'jealously guard' the public's right to the initia-
tive by interpreting initiatives to be consistent with the public's desires.").
7. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 695-96, 889 P.2d at 560-61, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366-67. See
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (defining the scope of the initiative power); 7 B.E. WrrKaN,
SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 121 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994)
(examining the scope of California's initiative power).
8. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 696, 889 P.2d at 561, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367.
9. Id. at 696-97, 889 P.2d at 561-62, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367-68. Section 9.108(a)
reserves this broad power and basically allows for "any ordinance . . . which is with-
in the power conferred upon the board of supervisors to enact, or any legislative act
which is within the power conferred upon any other board, commission or officer to
adopt, or any amendment to the charter." SAN FRANCIsCo CHARTER § 9.108(a).
10. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 697, 889 P.2d at 562, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368. This use of
"plain language" to interpret the meaning of the constitutional and charter provisions
stems from the principle that "when the language of a statute is clear, 'its plain
meaning should be followed.'" Id. at 716, 889 P.2d at 674, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
11. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 697-99, 889 P.2d at 562, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368. The con-
stitutional referendum power grants "the power of the electors to approve or reject
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However, he determined that the history behind the initiative power
suggests that these limitations do not extend to the use of initiatives to
decide tax-related issues."2 In order to clearly establish the divergence
between the initiative and referendum powers, Justice Baxter analyzed
the impact of each on the political system. A referendum, he explained,
generally takes time to process. 3 If taxes and other matters of special
urgency were decided by referendum, the county's ability to spend mon-
ey would be delayed and its ability to provide for its residents im-
paired. 4 The initiative has no such instantaneous impact. The initia-
tive process is significantly longer than the referendum process;" thus,
statutes or parts of statutes except urgency statues, statutes calling elections, and
statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the
State." CAL CONST. art II, § 9(a) (emphasis added). See generally 7 B.E. WITIN, SUM-
MARY OF CAuFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 122 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994)
(explaining the referendum power); 38 CAL. JUR. 3D Initiative and Referendum §§ 56-
63 (1977 & Supp. 1995) (same); 7 B.E. WrITaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Consti-
tutional Law §§ 123-125 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (exceptions to initiative and
referendum powers). The charter also provides that "ordinances levying taxes....
shall not be subject to referendum." SAN FRANcisco CHARTER § 9.108.
12. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 699-702, 889 P.2d at 563-65, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369-71. Jus-
tice Baxter determined that the history of the initiative power supports the fact that
the power was intended to extend to taxation issues. Id. at 699, 889 P.2d at 563, 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369. Since the adoption of the initiative provision by constitutional
amendment in 1911, many frustrated attempts have been made to amend it to prevent
its application to taxation issues. Id. at 699-702, 889 P.2d at 563-65, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 369-71. Justice Baxter also provided an expansive list of cases from 1911 to the
present which allowed taxation initiatives. Id. at 702 n.8, 889 P.2d at 565 n.8, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 371 n.8. The validity of the use of the initiative power to repeal a tax
was most recently confirmed in Carlson v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 724, 189 Cal. Rptr.
185 (1983). Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 704, 889 P.2d at 566, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372. See
generally KK DuVivier, By Going Wrong all Things Come Right: Using Alternate
Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L REv. 1185 (outlining the his-
tory of the voter initiative).
13. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 703, 889 P.2d at 565, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371. This delay
results from the referendum process which often requires suspension, "pending recon-
sideration and repeal of the ordinance by the board of supervisors or submission of
the measure to the voters at a regular or special election." Id.
14. Id. See Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method:
A Retrospective on the California Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL L. REV. 2007, 2030-31
(1988) (explaining California's "urgency statutes").
15. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 703-04, 889 P.2d at 566, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
16. Id.; see 38 CAL JUR. 3D, Initiative and Referendum §§ 45-51 (1994) (describing
the stages of the initiative process).
1421
local officials are duly forewarned and the county's budgetary efforts are
not upset. 7
However, Justice Baxter noted that a tax repeal initiative may be an
invalid use of the power; the functional equivalent of a referendum elimi-
nating a major revenue source and leaving no available, alternate revenue
source." He concluded that the utility tax repeal initiative was a valid
use of the initiative power since the initiative did not take immediate
effect or siphon an existing revenue source. 9
2. Mistakenly Applied Authority
Justice Baxter then addressed the court of appeal's conclusion that
neither referenda nor initiatives can be used to affect taxation. ° His
opinion was based on two lines of cases, Myers v. City Council of Pismo
Beach2 and Carlson v. Cory,2" and their progeny." The Myers rule, he
explained, has never been confirmed by the California Supreme Court
and "was merely dictum" in the Myers cases.24 Further, the Myers cases
dealt with situations that were not analogous to the instant case;
25
therefore, the Myers rule cannot be used as sound authority."6 Justice
Baxter was also unable to regard the Carlson cases as applicable author-
ity, "since none [of the cases] involved an initiative repeal of a tax ordi-
nance that is prospective only."27 Thus, because the appellate court mis-
takenly relied on improper authority, its decision was incorrect and fur-
17. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 703-04, 889 P.2d at 566, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
18. Id. at 710, 889 P.2d at 570, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376 (citing Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976)).
19. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 710, 889 P.2d at 570-71, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376-77.
20. Id. at 705, 889 P.2d at 567, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373.
21. 241 Cal. App. 2d 237, 50 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1966).
22. 139 Cal. App. 3d 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1983).
23. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 705-11, 809 P.2d at 567-71, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373-77.
24. Id. at 706, 889 P.2d at 567, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373.
25. Id. at 707, 889 P.2d at 568, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374. The Myers decision was
"limited to a general law city" where the taxing power was completely vested in the
legislature and the initiative power could not exceed the constitutional limits. Id.
Later decisions extended Myers to charter cities but "fail[ed] to acknowledge that the
immediate impact on current revenues is absent." Id. In Campen v. Greiner, 15 Cal.
App. 3d 836, 93 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1971), a case that used Myers as support, the court
refused to validate an initiative which created an immediate impact on city finances.
Rossi; 9 Cal. 4th at 707, 889 P.2d at 568, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374. In Gibbs v. City of
Napa, 59 Cal. App. 3d 148, 130 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1976), another case in the Myers line,
the court disallowed an initiative which "sought to intrude into" an administrative
function. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 708-09, 889 P.2d at 569, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375.
26. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 709, 889 P.2d at 570, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376.
27. Id. see, e.g., City of Atascadero v. Daly, 135 Cal. App. 3d 466, 185 Cal. Rptr.
228 (1982); Community Health Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 146 Cal. App. 3d 990,
194 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1983).
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ther precluded the "obligation to jealously guard the people's reserved
right of initiative.
" 28
3. Amendment by the Electorate
In the final part of the opinion, Justice Baxter considered the effect of
this decision on future tax ordinances. The initiative in question not only
repealed the utility tax on residential users, it also specifically granted its
amendment power to the electorateY As the California Constitution and
the San Francisco Charter both allow for this stipulation,' this initiative
can only be amended by the voters and future tax initiatives may legiti-
mately incorporate the same condition."a
B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
1. Legislative Intent Predominates a "Plain Meaning" Interpretation
Justice Mosk began his attack of the majority opinion with a stab at
Justice Baxter's use of the plain language rule of interpretation to find
that the initiative power can reach taxation issues.' While recognizing
that the plain meaning of the text is important, he explained that its
function is to aid in understanding "the intent of the lawmakers.""' This
supports the well-established principle that the legislative intent behind
28. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 710-11, 889 P.2d at 571, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377. See
Cynthia L Fountaine, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitu-
tionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL L. REV. 733, 750 (1988) ("[I]t is ex-
tremely difficult to successfully challenge a referendum or initiative that is facially
neutral . . . ."); see also Sutro, supra note 6, at 946. But see Elizabeth M. Stein,
Note, The California Constitution and the Counter-Initiative Quagmire, 21 HASTINGS
CONsT. LQ. 143, 162-63 (1993) (courts are increasingly willing to invalidate initiatives).
29. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 714-15, 889 P.2d at 573, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379-80.
30. Id. at 714-16, 889 P.2d at 573-74, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379. "The Legislature ...
may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective
only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment
or repeal without their approval." CAL CONsT. art II, § 10(c).
31. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 715, 889 P.2d at 573, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379. "[T]hrough
exercise of the initiative power, the people may bind future legislative bodies other
than the people themselves." Id. at 715-16, 889 P.2d at 574, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380
(emphasis omitted).
32. Id. at 716-17, 889 P.2d at 574-75, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380-81 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
33. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 716, 889 P.2d at 574, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
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the provision "prevails over the letter."" Thus, the court's main job in
interpreting the initiative provisions of the constitution and city charter
is to determine the framers' intent."
The dissent also stated that the majority erred in considering only the
express limitations restricting the initiative power." Justice Mosk identi-
fied several scenarios which create implied exceptions to the initiative
power where legislative intent to do so exists.37 He reasoned that there
is nothing prohibiting a reading of the constitutional and charter provi-
sions to contain a similar implied exception for taxation issues.'
2. Harmonize, Don't Isolate
Justice Mosk claimed that another factor in the majority's mistaken
evaluation of the initiative power was their evaluation of the constitu-
tional and charter provisions completely in isolation, without consider-
ation of other corresponding provisions, particularly the referendum
power. Justice Mosk found this analysis to be in direct controversy
with the well-settled tenet that statutes are not to be interpreted alone,
rather they must be harmonized with "all related provisions if it is rea-
sonably possible to do so without distorting their apparent meaning."40
The initiative and referendum powers are "inextricably linked" in both
the constitution and the city charter and thus, must be interpreted as a
unit.
4
'
34. Id. at 717, 889 P.2d at 575, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 718, 889 P.2d at 575, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
Sutro, supra note 6, at 956-57 (analysis of lawmaker intent, as determined by the
construction of similar statutes, is the basis for California initiative interpretation).
36. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 718-19, 889 P.2d at 576, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting).
37. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Among these implied exceptions are: (1) forcing the
legislature to adopt resolutions, (2) directing of the Legislature's inside procedures,
(3) exercising power over "matters of statewide concern . . . delegated to a local
legislative body," (4) local legislature's administrative duties, (5) Revising the constitu-
tion, or (6) "implementing" a second redistricting in the same decade." Id. at 719, 889
P.2d at 576, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 719-20, 889 P.2d at 576-77, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382-83 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
40. Id. at 720, 889 P.2d at 577, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(quoting Harbor v. Deukmejian, 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 1093, 742 P.2d 1290, 1298, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 569, 577 (1987)).
41. Id. at 720, 889 P.2d at 577, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The
provisions were written into both documents in conjunction with one another. Id.
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
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3. Functional Equivalent of a Referendum
Justice Mosk then noted that in both documents, the framers gave
great latitude to the initiative power and heavily burdened the referen-
dum power." Although such a construction is generally not problematic,
a problem arises when voters use the initiative power to do something
that the referendum power restrictions prevent.' Thus, they violate an-
other well-chronicled principle by doing "indirectly what the Constitution
prohibits doing directly."' Here, it was clear to Justice Mosk that the
voters had an objective (decrease residential taxes) which could not be
accomplished by referendum. Therefore, they used the initiative forum to
reach the same ends. 5 As a result, Justice Mosk decided that the initia-
tive was "the functional equivalent of a referendum,"" and to condone
such a circumvention would undermine "important constitutional limita-
tions."
47
Justice Mosk then considered the majority's contention that initiatives
which prospectively repeal taxes are not functionally equivalent to refer-
enda because they have no immediate impact on municipal fiscal ef-
forts.' He found no authority for this position and claimed that it is
based on uncertain legal grounds and is not supported by the express
language of the San Francisco Charter.49 Further, Justice Mosk re-
nounced this theory as "clash[ing] with fiscal reality""° because large
cities like San Francisco must plan certain finances far ahead of their
42. Id. at 721, 889 P.2d at 578, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 721-22, 889 P.2d at 578, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 722, 889 P.2d at 578, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Justice Mosk reviewed the history of this doctrine, citing 150 years of federal
and state case law supporting it. Id. at 722-27, 889 P.2d at 578-81, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
384-87 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925);
Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277 (1866); Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1983); Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Jordan, 200 Cal. 667, 254 P. 551 (1927); Wood
v. Riley, 192 Cal. 293, 219 P. 966 (1923); Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal. 601, 29 P. 1092
(1892).
45. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 728-29, 889 P.2d at 582-83, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388-89
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 729, 889 P.2d at 583, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 729-30, 889 P.2d at 583, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 730, 889 P.2d at 583, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
49. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 730-31, 889 P.2d at 583-84, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389-90
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 731, 889 P.2d at 584, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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implementation, thus tax initiatives will likely impair municipal budgetary
capabilities."
Next, Justice Mosk criticized the majority's position that a tax repeal
initiative "is not an invalid functional equivalent of a referendum" unless
it "eliminates a major revenue source" and leaves no other available re-
serve in the event of a fiscal crisis. 2 He found this exemption lacked
authority and observed that it created two major problems.' First, it
forces the courts to make political decisions in contravention of the
separation of powers doctrine, and secondly, it leaves governments with
indefinite revenue resources, hindering their fiscal planning capacity.'
Additionally, Justice Mosk determined that the instant case does not
meet this burden. The first prong fails because the city officials consid-
ered the repeal a major financial setback.5 Although the majority never
fully addressed the second prong, no current comparable funds exist and
voters are not likely to approve another tax in its place.'
Finally, Justice Mosk addressed the majority's argument that the histo-
ry of the initiative power supports its application in this case. 7 He
found the argument unpersuasive because their offered authority did not
address the same scenario,' and he avowed that the use of broad politi-
51. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Certain "obligations, such as the servicing of bonds
and the funding of multi-year employee contracts, ongoing social programs, and major
civic repair and construction projects" would fall into this category of long term fi-
nancing needs. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 731-32, 889 P.2d at 584-85, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390-91 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
53. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 732, 889 P.2d at 585, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
54. Id. at 732-33, 889 P.2d at 585, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Other questions stem from this exception such as "when is a lost revenue source
'major' . . . [or] . . . 'available?'" Id. at 733 n.12, 889 P.2d at 585 n.12, 38 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 391 n.12 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 733-34, 889 P.2d at 585-86, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391-92 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). "The City's controller estimated [the initiative would cost] the City ... a rev-
enue loss of approximately $10 million each year." Id. at 733, 889 P.2d at 585, 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Senator Dianne Feinstein explained: "The
10 million from this tax amounts to 143 police officers or 135 firemen or 200 nurs-
es . . . and over half of the public library's entire budget!" Id. at 734, 889 P.2d at
586, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Ballot Pamphlet, San Fran-
cisco City & County, argument against Prop. R (elec. of Nov. 3, 1987) p. 91).
56. Id. at 734, 889 P.2d at 586-87, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392-93 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 735, 889 P.2d at 587, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see
supra note 12 and accompanying text
58. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 736, 889 P.2d at 587, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Justice Mosk also claimed that the historical evidence offered by the
majority has little value in finding legislative intent. Id. at 736, 889 P.2d at 588, 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment
& Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 743 P.2d 1323, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1987)).
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cal campaign statements carries no weight in defining legislative in-
tent. 9 Justice Mosk briefly concluded by approving of the court of
appeal's reliance on Myers and subsequent cases,' finding them sup-
ported by the maxim "that what the Constitution prohibits directly can-
not be done indirectly."6 '
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The voter initiative power is an important tool in representative de-
mocracy.62 It empowers voters and allows them to change laws indepen-
dent from the agendas of politicians.' Although currently there is no na-
tional initiative power,' about half of the states have given the power to
their electorate.65 Oregon and California have the highest number of bal-
lot initiatives.' The California initiative power originated eighty-five
years ago and has since covered an expansive range of topics.6" It has
often been "the starting point for national political trends."'
Before the California Supreme Court's decision in Rossi v. Brown,'
the scope of the initiative power in areas where referendum use is pre-
vented had not yet been determined."0 Both the trial and appellate
courts regarded the initiative power as the functional equivalent of the
referendum power and thus invalid." However, four Justices dis-
agreed 2 with this characterization and approved the use of an initiative
59. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 736-37, 889 P.2d at 588, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
61. Id. at 737, 889 P.2d at 588, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
62. See Magleby, supra note 5, at 13-14; see also Stein, supra note 28, at 148-49.
63. Stein, supra note 28, at 149.
64. Magleby, supra note 5, at 42 ("The United States is one of only five democra-
cies which has never held a national referendum . . ").
65. Id. at 14-15. "Only six states west of the Mississippi River do not have some
form of initiative . . .while only eight states east of the Mississippi have the pro-
cess." Id. at 15.
66. DuVivier, supra note 12, at 1189.
67. Stein, supra note 28, at 148. "Subjects ranged from women's suffrage to regu-
lation of railroads and utilities to improved oversight of judicial elections." Id.
68. Id. at 144 ("[Niational movements have begun at the California polls.").
69. 9 Cal. 4th 688, 889 P.2d 557, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363 (1995).
70. Id. at 705, 889 P.2d at 567, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373. The California Supreme
Court noted that this issue "is a question of first impression in this court." Id.
71. Id. at 694, 889 P.2d at 560, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366.
72. See supra note 1. The sharp division of the court indicates that future cases
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to accomplish objectives unattainable by referendum." They further
held that the power to amend the initiative could be legitimately limited
to the electorate.74
The Rossi decision goes against the trend toward limiting electorate
control of tax measures" by making it possible for voters to do by ini-
tiative that which is unconstitutional by referendum.7 ' As long as the
substance of an initiative is not expressly limited by the language of the
state constitution or the city charter, it is valid under the Rossi ruling.
77
The Rossi decision will have the greatest impact on the San Francisco
public who have dodged ten million dollars in taxes annually. Although
this ruling is considered "a victory for the people's power to control
taxation,"78 it will likely force a reduction of vital public services.79 Per-
haps the voters will find a way to compensate for the lost funds, and use
their nearly limitless initiative power to implement that plan.
JENNIFER A. POPICK
addressing this issue may be decided differently if there is a change in the bench.
73. Rossi, 9 Cal. 4th at 714, 889 P.2d at 573, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379.
74. Id. at 715-16, 889 P.2d at 573, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379.
75. See Charles Burress, State High Court Rulings Strengthen Local Initiatives/
S.F. Case Allows Voters to Repeal Tax, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 7, 1995, at A13.
76. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
78. Burress, supra note 75 (quoting San Francisco Chief Assistant City Attorney,
Dennis Aftergut).
79. See supra note 53-54.
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HI. MORTGAGES
A lender's fraud action against a third party who in-
duced the lender to make loans is not barred by the
lender's purchase of the property by full credit bid at a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale: Alliance Mortgage Co. v.
Rothwell.
I. INTRODUCTION.
In Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell,' the California Supreme Court
considered whether a mortgage company's acquisition of security prop-
erty at a norn udicial foreclosure sale precluded it from asserting a claim
against a third party who fraudulently induced the mortgage company
into lending on the property.2 Resolving a conflict among the lower
courts, the supreme court held that the lender's full credit bids did not
1. 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 900 P.2d 601, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (1995). Justice Arabian
wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Mosk, Kennard, Baxter, and George
concurred. Id. at 1226-51, 900 P.2d at 601-17, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 352-68. Justice
Werdegar wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas concurred. Id. at
1251-54, 900 P.2d at 617-19, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368-70 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 1232, 900 P.2d at 603, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354. The defendants in the
present case were Laurie Rothwell, a real estate broker, Pioneer Title Company
(which became North American Title Company), and Ticor Title Insurance Company.
Id. at 1232, 900 P.2d at 603-04, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354-55. "From 1983 through 1985,
[the defendants] devised and implemented an elaborate scheme to fraudulently induce
Alliance . . . to lend money for the purchase of nine Bay area residences." Id. To
induce Alliance to make the loans, the Rothwell group created two sham companies
to verify the employment of fictitious borrowers, falsely appraise the properties, and
file misleading title reports. Id. It was not until after the borrowers defaulted and
Alliance acquired title to the properties through the foreclosure sale that Alliance
discovered the defendants' fraudulent conduct, Id. at 1232-33, 900 P.2d at 604-05, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 355-56.
Alliance then brought an action for damages against the defendants, claiming
(among other things) negligent and intentional misrepresentation, breach of contract,
and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1233, 900 P.2d at 605, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356.
Defendants North American and Ticor moved to strike portions of the complaint,
asserting that Alliance's purchase of the property by full credit bid barred the action.
Id. at 1233-34, 900 P.2d at 605, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356. The trial court granted the
defendants' motions and entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defen-
dants. Id. at 1234, 900 P.2d at 605, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356. The court of appeal re-
versed, holding that the lender's full credit bid did not preclude the fraud claim,
since the damages for fraud would not be a recovery for any deficiency on the un-
derlying debt. Id.
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preclude the action because the lender sought to recover for fraud rather
than for impairment of a security interest.3 The court, therefore, affirmed
the court of appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.4
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Arabian began the majority opinion by reviewing some basic
principles of real property loan transactions,' and the relationship be-
tween foreclosure and antideficiency statutes.6 The court noted that in a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the creditor may not seek a deficiency judg-
ment.7 The court pointed out, however, that a suit for fraud did not in-
volve the type of recovery which the antideficiency statutes preclude.8
The court then discussed the "full credit bid rule."9 When a lender
3. Id. at 1246, 900 P.2d at 613, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 364-65. The supreme court
recognized the lower court's express disagreement with the result reached in Western
Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Sawyer, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1615, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639
(1992) and GN Mortgage Corp. v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 4th 1802,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 47 (1994). Id. at 1234, 900 P.2d at 605, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356.
4. Alliance, 10 Cal. 4th at 1251, 900 P.2d at 616-17, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367-68.
5. Id. at 1235, 900 P.2d at 605-06, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356-57. See generally 44
CAL. JUR. 3D Mortgages §§ 21-32 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (discussing rights and duties of
mortgagee and mortgagor); 44 CAL. JUR. 3D Mortgages §§ 33-42 (1994 & Supp. 1995)
(explaining transfers of mortgaged property).
6. Alliance, 10 Cal. 4th at 1236-38, 900 P.2d at 606-08, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357-59.
See generally 3 B.E. WIrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Security Transactions in
Real Property §§ 156-157 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing availability of defi-
ciency after foreclosure sale); Stanley L. Iezman & Russell B. Arnold, Personal Liabil-
ity in Commercial Loan Transactions, 28 BEVERLY HLLs B.A. J. 38 (1994) (evaluating
foreclosure actions and deficiency judgments from the lender's point of view).
7. Alliance, 10 Cal. 4th at 1236, 900 P.2d at 606-07, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357-58; see
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 580b, 580d (West Supp. 1995) (disallowing deficiency
judgment for purchase money mortgages or foreclosure under power of sale).
8. Alliance, 10 Cal. 4th at 1237-38, 900 P.2d at 607-08, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 358-59;
see 44 CAL. JUR. 3D Mortgages § 46 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (effect of fraud on satis-
faction of mortgage); see CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1995) (allowing
fraudulent inducement of loan as exception to the "one action" rule applied to fore-
closures). See generally Andrew A. Bassak, Comment, Secured Transaction Guaran-
tors in California: Is it Time to Reevaluate the Validity and Timing of Waivers of
Rights?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 265 (1992) (examining the effect of antideficiency
legislation in sections 580 and 726 of California Civil Procedure Code).
9. Alliance, 10 Cal. 4th at 1238-39, 900 P.2d at 608, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359. The
court defined full credit bid as "a bid [by the lender] 'in an amount equal to the
unpaid principal and interest of the mortgage debt'" including costs, fees, and expens-
es. Id. at 1238, 900 P.2d at 608, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359 (quoting Cornelison v.
Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 606 n.10, 542 P.2d 981, 992 n.10, 125 Cal. Rptr. 557, 568
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makes a successful credit bid for the outstanding balance of the debt, the
lender (now as purchaser) cannot later claim that the property was
worth less than the bid or pursue other remedies to collect on the un-
derlying debt.'" The court noted that when applying the full credit bid
rule to cases involving fraud and bad faith, courts of appeal have reached
different results." Some have held fraud and conversion claims to be
barred by the rule, while others allowed fraud claims to go forward de-
spite the lender's full credit bid.2
The court then reviewed the elements of a fraud claim and the differ-
ent possible measures of damages. 3 The court noted that when a victim
has been defrauded by a fiduciary, the "benefit of the bargain" measure
of damages should apply.'4
Turning to the instant case, the majority found that because the
plaintiffs full credit bid did not bar a fraud claim, judgment on the
pleadings was improper.5 The court based this finding on the fact that,
while a lender making a full credit bid assumes the risk that its bid will
n.10 (1975)).
10. Id. See generally 3 B.E. WIflN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Security Trans-
actions in Real Property § 155 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (explaining effect of full
credit bid by lienholder at foreclosure sale).
11. Alliance, 10 Cal. 4th at 1243, 900 P.2d at 611, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362.
12. Id. at 1243-45, 900 P.2d at 611-13, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362-64 (discussing the
conflict between the court of appeal decision in the instant case with that in Western
Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Sawyer, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1615, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639
(1992) and GN Mortgage Corp. v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 4th 1802,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 47 (1994)).
13. Id. at 123941, 900 P.2d at 608-10, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359-61. The court re-
viewed the five elements of a fraud claim: misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity,
intent, unjustifiable reliance, and damage. Id. The court noted that in the present
case only the elements of justifiable reliance and resulting damages were at issue.
Id.; see CAL CIrV. CODE § 1710 (West Supp. 1995) (defining deceit); CAL CIV. CODE §
3343 (West Supp. 1995) (listing measure of damages for fraud in the purchase or sale
of property). See generally 5 B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Torts § 711
(9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (defining reliance); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 67 (1994) (discuss-
ing conditions precedent to a fraud action).
14. Alliance, 10 Cal. 4th at 1240-41, 900 P.2d at 609-10, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360-61.
"Benefit of the bargain" damages are defined as those damages which "award . . .
the difference in value between what the plaintiff actually received and what he was
fraudulently led to believe he would receive." Id. at 1240, 900 P.2d at 609, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 360. This measure is broader than the alternative, "out of pocket" damag-
es, which are awarded as "the difference in actual value at the time of the transac-
tion between what the plaintiff gave and what he received." Id.
15. Id. at 1251, 900 P.2d at 616, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367.
be sound, an intentional misrepresentation by the defendants as to the
property's value was not "within the realm of that risk." 6 The court,
therefore, affirmed the lower holding that the defendants could not use
Alliance's full credit bid as a defense to their own fraud.'7 The court
further noted that "the full credit bid rule was not intended to immunize
wrongdoers from the consequences of their fraudulent acts."
In analyzing the reliance requirement, the court held that the full credit
bid rule would not apply so long as Alliance's reliance on the misrepre-
sentations made by the defendants was not "manifestly unreasonable." 9
Since this issue required a factual determination,2" it could not be evalu-
ated in the context of a judgment on the pleadings, and therefore the
case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.2'
B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Werdegar agreed that the trial court should not have granted
judgment on the pleadings, but disagreed with the majority as to the
limitation on damages.22 Justice Werdegar would have allowed Alliance
to recover out-of-pocket damages even if it was not justified in making a
full credit bid at the foreclosure sale, because Alliance justifiably relied
upon the defendants' fraud when issuing the loans.23
16. Id. at 1246, 900 P.2d at 613-14, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 364-65.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1246, 900 P.2d at 614, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365. The court also rejected
the defendant's argument that, according to BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct.
1757 (1994), the court should not question the value of the property established by
the lienholder's bid. Id. at 1250-51, 900 P.2d at 616, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367. The
court noted that, although BFP provided that "reasonably equivalent value" was the
price in fact received at a foreclosure sale, a claim of fraud remained an established
exception to the finality of a property sale. Id. For a thorough review of BFP and its
effect on foreclosure sales in the bankruptcy setting, see David P. Schwartz, Note,
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation: Critiquing the Supreme Court's Method of De-
termining "Reasonably Equivalent Value" Within the Context of Bankruptcy Fore-
closures, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 345 (1995).
19. Alliance, 10 Cal. 4th at 1247-48, 900 P.2d at 614, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1251, 900 P.2d at 617, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368.
22. Id. at 1251-52, 900 P.2d at 617, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368 (Werdegar, J., concur-
ring).
23. Id. at 1252-53, 900 P.2d at 617-18, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368-69 (Werdegar, J.,
concurring). Justice Werdegar looked to the initial transaction as the focal point for
justifiable reliance, finding that Alliance had suffered initial damage "when it loaned
money to unqualified borrowers on inadequate security." Id. at 1253 n.1, 900 P.2d at
618 n.1, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369 n.1 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
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III. IMPACT
The present ruling resolves conflicting decisions within the California
Courts of Appeal as to whether a lender's full credit bid may preclude a
subsequent recovery for fraud." In ruling that the defendants' fraudulent
conduct gave rise to a cause of action separate from the impairment of
plaintiffs security, the court excepted fraud claims from the one action
rule applicable in antideficiency cases."
In so doing, the court has clarified the distinction between the impair-
ment of a security interest (through the overvaluation of property) and
fraudulent deception as to the nature of the security property." In rul-
ing that fraud by a lender's agent to induce a loan remained a separate
action, the court upheld an important public policy consideration as well:
third parties who fraudulently induce lenders to make loans cannot use
the lender's full credit bid as a defense.27
IV. CONCLUSION
While antideficiency statutes were designed to protect the borrower
from multiple actions by the lender, fraud on the part of a third party
will remain actionable.' Therefore, even though the lender purchases
the security property through a full credit bid, the fraudulent misrepre-
24. Id. at 1245, 900 P.2d at 612-13, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363-64. The court here
agreed with the court of appeal ruling that both Western Fed. and GN Mortgage were
wrongly decided. Id. The court of appeal "concluded that '[tihe central error of West-
ern Federal . .. and GN Mortgage . . . is the failure to appreciate that because the
full credit bid rule was conceived only to further the debtor protection purposes of
the antideficiency statutes, it has no application in actions against parties not sued as
debtors.'" Id. at 1245, 900 P.2d at 613, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 364.
25. Id. at 1249, 900 P.2d at 615, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. See generally Michael H.
Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s
and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L REV. 1261, 1274-
77 (1991) (reviewing several states' statutes regarding deficiency judgments and debt-
or protection provided by "one action" rules).
26. Alliance, 10 Cal. 4th at 1249, 900 P.2d at 615, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366.
"(D]efendants did not damage or impair Alliance's security interests rather, they de-
ceived Alliance at the outset as to what the security was." Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 1246, 900 P.2d at 614, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365.
28. "Alliance's action for fraud against these nonborrower third parties is not an
attempt to collect its debt, and application of the full credit bid rule in fact would
protect defendants from the consequences of their allegedly fraudulent acts." Id. at
1254, 900 P.2d at 619, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
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sentation used to induce the lender to make a loan gives rise to a sepa-
rate cause of action for damages.'
DEBRA E. BEST
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29. For an excellent overview of California foreclosure sale procedures, see Reid
Breitman, Note, Equating California Foreclosure Sales with Ordinary Residential
Sales, 68 S. CAL. L REV. 947, 978 (1995).
(Vol. 23: 1395, 1996] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
IV. PROBATE
A trustee has standing to appeal a determination that a
trust beneficiary's proposed claim would not violate the
trust's no contest provision: Estate of Goulet v. Goulet.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Estate of Goulet v. Goulet,' the California Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a trustee may appeal a court's determination that a
beneficiary's proposed action would not violate the trust's no contest
clause.2 The court weighed a trustee's diverging duties to defend and
1. 10 Cal. 4th 1074, 898 P.2d 425, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 111 (1995). Justice Werdegar
authored the majority opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Arabian, Baxter, and George joined. Id. at 1076-86, 898 P.2d at 425-32, 43 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 111-18. Justice Kennard, joined by Justice Mosk, filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
at 1086-101, 898 P.2d at 432-42, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118-28 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1076-77, 898 P.2d at 425, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111. On August 23, 1992,
Donald R. Scott Goulet, who was dying from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), and Esther Montello, his acquaintance of many years, executed a "Premarital
Agreement" and were married in Las Vegas, Nevada. Id. at 1077, 898 P.2d at 425, 43
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111-12. They separated the following day. Id. at 1077, 898 P.2d at
425, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111. The premarital agreement stated that the parties main-
tained separate property interests in assets acquired before and after the marriage.
Id. at 1077, 898 P.2d at 425, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112. Other provisions were incorpo-
rated by addenda to the premarital agreement, including Goulet's promises to pay
Montello $2500 per month until she reached the age of 75, to purchase a home for
her worth more than $500,000, to lease a new car for her, to pay for her living ex-
penses until the home was purchased, and to provide health and life insurance for
her and her children. Id. at 1077, 898 P.2d at 425-26, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112. Six
weeks later in Los Angeles County Superior Court, Goulet claimed he had been of
unsound mind and sought an annulment of the marriage that the court granted fol-
lowing Montello's default. Id. at 1077, 898 P.2d at 426, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112.
Gouet's will and declaration of trust were executed prior to the resolution of
the annulment proceedings. Id. Goulet's will, which included a no contest clause,
transferred Goulet's entire estate to the trust, classified all of Goulet's property as
separate (as stated in the premarital agreement), and expressly disinherited Montelo
and her children. Id. Goulet's will recited that he had made "adequate provision" for
Montello and her children in the trust. Id. The trust instrument, which also included
a no contest clause, provided Montello $75,000 contingent upon her accepting the
validity of the trust and the will. Id. at 1078, 898 P.2d at 426, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
112. After the marriage was annulled, Gouet executed a codicil to the will naming
his friends, Clint Burke and John Ferry, as co-executors and recited that the marriage
had been annulled. Id. Gouet also executed an amendment to the declaration of
trust that named Burke and Ferry as successor trustees and restated the $75,000 gift
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administer the trust according to the trustor's intent against his respon-
sibility to act impartially toward all beneficiaries.3 Relying on law and
policy, the California Supreme Court held that a trustee has a right to
appeal a determination that a beneficiary's proposed claim would not
violate the trust's no contest provision.4
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The court began its discussion by reviewing Smith v. Esslinger.5 The
court of appeal in Goulet relied on Smith and held that the trustee was
barred from appealing the probate court's order.' In determining when a
trustee may appeal a court order, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Smith stated that a trustee is aggrieved by a court order that affects the
"existence, modification or termination of the trust."7 However, Smith
held that a trustee is not aggrieved by a court order that determines the
to Goulet's "former spouse." Id. On March 28, 1993, Goulet died. Id. His estate ulti-
mately had a value of approximately $5,000,000 to $5,500,000. Id.
During the probate proceedings, Montello sought a determination from the pro-
bate court whether she would violate the no contest clause of the will or trust by
filing a creditor's claim against the estate to enforce her purported rights under the
premarital agreement. Id. at 1078-79, 898 P.2d at 426, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112; see
also CAL. PROB. CODE § 21320 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) (granting a beneficiary of an
instrument containing a no contest clause the right to seek with impunity a determi-
nation from the court whether a proposed act would violate the no contest provi-
sion); Laura J. Fowler, Administration of Estates, 26 PAC. LJ. 272 (1995) (discussing
California Probate Code § 21320). The court noted that the 1994 changes to probate
code § 21320 did not alter the court's analysis. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1078 n.2, 898
P.2d at 426 n.2, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112 n.2. Ferry, acting as special administrator of
Goulet's estate, opposed the action. Id. at 1079, 898 P.2d at 426, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
112-13. The probate court held that Montello's proposed action would not be a con-
test within the meaning of the no contest clauses of the will or the trust. Id. at
1079, 898 P.2d at 426, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113. Ferry appealed this determination, but
the court of appeal concluded that Ferry lacked standing because he was not an
aggrieved party. Id. at 1079 & n.3, 898 P.2d at 426-27 & n.3, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113
& n.3; see CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 902 (West 1980) (granting right of appeal to ag-
grieved parties); County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 736, 488 P.2d 953,
957, 97 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389 (1971) (defining an aggrieved party as one whose "rights
or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment").
3. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1080-81, 898 P.2d at 428, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.
4. Id. at 1080, 898 P.2d at 427, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113.
5. 26 Cal. App. 4th 579, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673 (1994).
6. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1079, 898 P.2d at 427, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113.
7. Id. (citing Smith, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 583, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676 (quoting
Estate of Bunn, 33 Cal. 2d 897, 899, 206 P.2d 635, 636-37 (1949))). See generally 9
B.E. WrrIaN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 146 (3d ed. 1985) (discussing trustees'
ability to appeal).
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"conflicting claims of beneficiaries" because of the trustee's duty of im-
partiality." Smith held that a trustee lacks standing to appeal a court
order that construes a trust's no contest clause under California Probate
Code section 21320 because the court order protects, rather than injures,
the trustee.9
In overturning Smith, the majority in Goulet first found support in the
policy that requires a trust to be administered according to the trustor's
intent." The supreme court reasoned that if a probate court made an
erroneous determination under section 21320, often there would not be
any beneficiary who possessed both standing and motivation to under-
take the expensive and risky appeal." Thus, only the trustee would re-
main to defend the trustor's intent. 2 Additionally, the majority noted
that the trustee's duty to administer the trust according to Goulet's ex-
pressed desires was implicated by the potential claim of the "former
8. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1079, 898 P.2d at 427, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113 (citing
Smith, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 583, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676); see CAL PROB. CODE
§ 16003 (West 1991) (stating duty of impartiality). See generally 9 B.E. WITIGN, CAI-
FORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 146 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1995) (analyzing cases when
trustees may not appeal).
9. Smith, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 584-85, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676; accord Krause v.
Tullo, 835 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). But see Poag v. Winston, 195 Cal. App. 3d
1161, 241 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1987) (considering a trustee's appeal from a determination
that a beneficiary's act did not violate the no contest provision of the trust). See
generally 12 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate §§ 530-535
(9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (discussing no contest clauses); 64 CAL. JUR. 3D Wills
§§ 443-468 (1994) (analyzing in terrorem clauses generally under California law); 60
CAL JUR. 3D Trusts §§ 42, 301 (1994) (examining no contest clauses in trusts); Dana
T. Pickard & Janet B. O'Connor, The Fiduciary's Standard of Care in the Enforce-
ment, Contest, or Compromise of Claims in Favor of or Against the Estate, 30 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1995) (discussing trustee's duties with respect to the trust's
disputes).
10. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1080-81, 898 P.2d at 428, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114; CAL
PROB. CODE § 21304 (West 1991) (calling for strict construction of no contest clauses
to determine trustor's intent). See generally Catherine Convy, California Supreme
Court Survey, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 866 (1995) (discussing judicial construction of the
trustor's intent in no contest clause); James L Robertson, Myth and Reality-Or, Is
it "Perception and Taste"?-in the Reading of Donative Documents, 61 FORDHAM L
REV. 1045 (1993) (examining interpretation of donor's intent in wills and trusts).
11. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1081, 898 P.2d at 428, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114. Smith
and Goulet represent two examples where trustees attempted to appeal a § 21320
determination even though the "aggrieved" beneficiaries acquiesced. Id. at 1081 & n.5,
898 P.2d at 428 & n.5, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114 & n.5; Smith, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 585,
31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676.
12. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1081, 898 P.2d at 428, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.
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spouse" because her claim might be large enough to force the trustee to
modify Goulet's original distributional scheme." The majority reasoned
that excluding a trustee from the class of parties aggrieved by section
21320 determinations would increase the likelihood that erroneous pro-
bate court determinations would go uncorrected, thereby potentially
frustrating the trustor's intent."1 Although a trustee in his or her repre-
sentative capacity may subsequently defend creditors' claims against the
estate, the issue of whether a beneficiary's proposed act is a contest
would be conclusively determined by the section 21320 determination. 5
Therefore, the court enabled trustees to fully defend the trustor's ex-
pressed desires by appealing an order construing the trust's no contest
provision."
Grappling next with a trustee's competing duties to deal impartially
with beneficiaries on the one hand, and to defend the trust corpus
against unwarranted diminution on the other, the majority concluded
that the "anomalous" rule that allowed a trustee to oppose, but not to
appeal, a section 21320 determination was inherently flawed.' If a sec-
tion 21320 determination could decrease the value of the trust fund, then
opposing the order clearly falls within the scope of a trustee's duties.'"
The majority reasoned that a trustee is analogous to an administrator of
an estate because both have a similar duty to defend the property en-
trusted to his or her care.'" An administrator is an aggrieved party when
a ruling may diminish the estate confided to his care.2" Therefore, the
court held that a trustee has a right to appeal a section 21320 determina-
tion that implicates the trustee's duties to protect the trust.
2
'
The majority relied upon legislative intent in finding that a trustee is
aggrieved by a court's determination that a beneficiary's act violates or
does not violate a trust's no contest clause." The majority explained
13. Id. at 1082, 898 P.2d at 429, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1081, 898 P.2d at 428, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.
16. Id. The majority recognized the existence of a similar rule allowing a fiduciary
to defend the trustor's intent by appealing a decree determining the relative rights of
beneficiaries if some of them are unable to represent themselves. Id. at 1085 & n.8,
898 P.2d at 431 & n.8, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117 & n.8 (citing Smith, 26 Cal. App. 4th
at 583, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676 (quoting In re Ferrall's Estate, 33 Cal. 2d 202, 205,
200 P.2d 1, 3 (1948))).
17. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1082, 898 P.2d at 429, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
18. Id. Montello conceded this point. Id.
19. Id. at 1082, 898 P.2d at 429, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115; see In re Estate of
Heydenfeldt, 117 Cal. 551, 553-54, 49 P. 713, 713-14 (1897).
20. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1082, 898 P.2d at 429, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115;
Heydenfeldt, 117 Cal. at 553, 49 P. at 713.
21. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1082-83, 898 P.2d at 429, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
22. Id. at 1082, 1085 & n.9, 898 P.2d at 429, 431 & n.9, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115,
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that a trustee's duties are implicated by section 21320 determinations be-
cause of the statutory requirement that a trustee be notified of section
21320 applications and because of the provisions allowing a trustee to
respond initially to such actions.'
The majority expressly refused to hold that a trustee's duty to defend
the trust is subsumed by the duty of impartiality when a court order is
issued.24 Addressing again the similarities between an administrator of
an estate and a trustee, the court observed that although an administra-
tor of an estate may not appeal a final distribution order, an administra-
tor may nevertheless appeal decrees issued before the final distribution
order to defend the trust and carry out the intended plan of distribu-
tion.25 Because a section 21320 determination may occur before the con-
clusion of probate proceedings, the court reasoned that a trustee's appeal
of a section 21320 determination is analogous to an administrator's right
to appeal decrees issued before the final distribution order.26 Therefore,
the majority held that a trustee may appeal from section 21320 determi-
nations.27
The majority buttressed its holding in Goulet by relying on the public
policies in California favoring enforcement of no contest clauses' and
encouraging judicial economy.' The policy in favor of enforcing no con-
117 & n.9.
23. Id. at 1082-83, 1085, 898 P.2d at 429, 431, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115, 117; see
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1220, 21322 (West 1991) (requiring that notice of § 21320 appli-
cations be given to trustee or other fiduciary). The majority openly invited the legisla-
ture to enact a contrary rule in the event that the majority misconstrued legislative
intent. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1085, 898 P.2d at 431, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117. By recog-
nizing the right of a trustee to appeal a § 21320 determination, the majority overruled
In re Estate of Murphy, 145 Cal. 464, 78 P. 960 (1904). The court observed, however,
that Murphy had been decided prior to the enactment of the statutory scheme from
which the majority inferred the legislative intent to involve trustees in § 21320 deter-
minations. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1083 n.6, 898 P.2d at 429 n.6, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
115 n.6.
24. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1083, 898 P.2d at 429-30, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115-16.
25. Id. at 1083-84, 898 P.2d at 430, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116; Estate of Kessler, 32
Cal. 2d 367, 196 P.2d 559 (1948).
26. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1084, 898 P.2d at 430, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116.
27. Id. at 1084, 898 P.2d at 430, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116-17.
28. Id. at 1084-85, 898 P.2d at 430-31, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117; Burch v. George, 7
Cal. 4th 246, 866 P.2d 92, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165 (1994); CAL. PROB. CODE § 21303
(West 1991) (upholding the enforceability of no contest clauses). See generally 12
B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNiA LAW, Wills and Probate § 532 (9th ed. 1990 &
Supp. 1995) (discussing the enforceability of no contest clauses).
29. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1084-85, 898 P.2d at 430-31, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117.
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test clauses flows from the desire to effectuate the trustor's intent.0
The majority observed that prohibiting a trustee from appealing an erro-
neous section 21320 determination could undermine the trustor's intent
and decrease the effectiveness of the no contest clause.3 ' The majority
also explained that its holding will ultimately decrease litigation and
thereby further judicial economy by deflecting claims likely to flow from
an erroneous 21320 determination were the trustee not permitted to ap-
peal. 2
Finally, the majority emphasized that permitting a trustee to appeal a
section 21320 determination would protect fundamental policies, but
would not harm the claimants' ability to assert their claims on the merits
in the appropriate fora-a
B. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority for needlessly disrupting
the "well-developed body of law" governing when a fiduciary is aggrieved
by a court's ruling.' Because a section 21320 proceeding determines
whether a proposed act violates a trust's no contest clause and conse-
quently requires the offending beneficiary to forfeit his or her share un-
der the trust, the dissent characterized the section 21320 proceeding as
one that merely determines the beneficiaries' relative shares.3 ' A trustee
is not aggrieved by an order determining the shares of the beneficiaries
in the estate under his or her care.' A trustee acts as a mere stakehold-
er under the direction of the court and must remain impartial to the
court's disposition of the trust.3 The dissent opined that giving a trustee
the ability to appeal an order under section 21320 forces the trustee to
violate the fundamental duty of impartiality.' Therefore, the dissent
concluded, a trustee can not be aggrieved by a court's determination that
30. Id. at 1085, 898 P.2d at 431, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117; Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 254,
866 P.2d at 96, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168.
31. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1085, 898 P.2d at 431, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1086, 898 P.2d at 432, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118.
34. Id. at 1094, 898 P.2d at 437, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 123 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 1087, 1093, 898 P.2d at 432, 436, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118, 122 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
36. This fundamental rule, upon which the dissent based its decision, has been
established in California for more than a century and is followed by nearly every
jurisdiction. Id. at 1089-90, 898 P.2d at 434, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 1086, 1091-93, 898 P.2d at 432, 435-36, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118, 121-22
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1093-94, 898 P.2d at 436-37, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122-23 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
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a beneficiary's proposed act would violate the trust's no contest
clause. 9
In contrast to the majority,4" the dissent reasoned that the statutes
containing the notice requirement"1 and the trustee's duty to follow the
trust instrument4 2 are not the equivalent of the legislative intent granting
the trustee standing to litigate the underlying issue. The purpose of the
notice requirement is to keep the fiduciary informed." The dissent ex-
plained that the legislature granted standing to appeal only to "aggrieved"
parties,45 and that a trustee's duty of impartiality precludes a finding
that a trustee is aggrieved by a court's ruling on whether a beneficiary's
contemplated act is a contest.4 6
Even assuming that the notice requirement did give a party standing to
appeal, the dissent noted that under the particular facts of Goulet, the
trustee did not have a right to notice of the section 21320 action and did
not oppose the initial action.4 7 Even if the same person is named as
trustee of a trust and executor of an estate, his or her duties are as dis-
tinct as if separate people had been named.' The dissent noted that
Ferry acted as administrator of Goulet's estate, not as trustee, when he
opposed the section 21320 determination in the trial court.49
The dissent objected to the majority inferring legislative intent where
the legislature had specifically declared that the common law governed
the law of trusts and the enforceability of no contest clauses unless mod-
39. Id. at 1091, 1094, 898 P.2d at 435, 437, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121, 123 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
40. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
41. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21322 (West 1991).
42. Id. § 16000.
43. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1095-97, 898 P.2d at 437-38, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124-25
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1096, 898 P.2d at 438, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124 (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
45. Id. at 1095, 898 P.2d at 437, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 123 (Kennard, J., dissenting);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 902 (West 1980).
46. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1096-97, 898 P.2d at 439, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125
(Kennard, J., dissenting); see supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
47. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1097, 898 P.2d at 439, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125 (Kennard,
J., dissenting). The dissent questioned whether a trustee even had the right to oppose
such actions initially. Id. at 1098-100, 898 P.2d at 440-41, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126-27
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1097 n.7, 898 P.2d at 439 n.7, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125 n.7 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 1097, 898 P.2d at 439, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
ified by statute.5 Murphy, part of California's common law, held that a
fiduciary may not appeal a court order determining whether a
beneficiary's action is a contest." Thus, the dissent would not grant a
trustee a right that was not conferred by the legislature and is prohibited
by the common law of California. 2
The dissent, in distinguishing orders that require an administrator to
make a partial distribution from determinations under section 21320,
emphasized that a section 21320 determination does not reach the merits
of the underlying claim, but rather merely determines the shares to
which a beneficiary is entitled.' Orders requiring an administrator to
make interim payments, in contrast, could force an unfair preference in
favor of the claimants prematurely paid over the claimants who are paid
later, especially in cases of insufficient funds.' Therefore, the dissent
rejected the analogy that because an administrator may appeal an order
to make partial distribution or interim payments, a trustee may also ap-
peal a section 21320 determination.55
Finally, the dissent rejected as baseless the majority's contention that
allowing trustees to appeal determinations under section 21320 will ulti-
mately decrease litigation.'
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Before Goulet, a trustee lacked standing to appeal a court's determina-
tion that a beneficiary's proposed act would violate the trust's no contest
provision.57 This antiquated rule (according to the majority) was the ba-
sis for the holding in Murphy nearly a century ago and was followed by
Smith in 1994. s' In Goulet, the California Supreme Court overturned
50. Id. at 1101, 898 P.2d at 442, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128 (Kennard, J., dissenting);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 15002 (West 1991) (stating common law governs the law of trusts
generally, except as modified by statute); id. § 21301 (stating common law governs
enforcement of no contest clauses except as modified by statute).
51. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1101, 898 P.2d at 442, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128 (Kennard,
J., dissenting); In re Estate of Murphy, 145 Cal. 464, 78 P. 960 (1904); accord Smith
v. Esslinger, 26 Cal. App. 4th 579, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673 (1994).
52. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1101, 898 P.2d at 442, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1097-98, 898 P.2d at 439-40, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125-26 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
54. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1097, 898 P.2d at 439, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125 (Kennard, J., dissenting);
see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
56. Goulet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1100-01, 898 P.2d at 441-42, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127-28
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
57. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 6, 9.
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these decisions and affirmed a trustee has a right to defend the trust by
appealing section 21320 determinations. 9 Goulet represents the heavy
weight given to the policy favoring the trustor's intent.6 Barring new
legislation to the contrary, Goulet presents new considerations for both
trustees and beneficiaries.
For trustees, this new rule represents another weapon to combat
claims that violate the trust's no contest provision and contravene the
trustor's expressed intent. Conceivably, under Goulet a trustee may also
appeal from a determination that a beneficiary's proposed act did violate
the no contest clause and thereby contravened the trustor's intent.6
Goulet forces trustees to make another decision while administering the
trust. This decision, whether to appeal a section 21320 determination,
should be held to the same negligence standard applicable to trustees.
For beneficiaries who, like Montello in the instant case, seek determi-
nations under section 21320 whether their contemplated acts will violate
the no contest provisions of a trust, Goulet potentially places an addi-
tional obstacle in the path of pursuing the contemplated action. A
trustee's decision to appeal a section 21320 determination represents an
additional delay and financial burden for the beneficiary. A beneficiary
will likely be forced to consider the increased risk and cost when con-
templating whether to petition the court pursuant to section 21320 to
interpret the trust's no contest clause.
KIRK ALAN WALTON
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59. Gouiet, 10 Cal. 4th at 1080-81, 898 P.2d at 428, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.
60. See id.
61. See id.
V. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
During a state of emergency where aerial spraying of
malathion is used to eradicate the Mediterranean fruit
fly, manufacturers and distributors of malathion are
under no private tort duty of care to warn the public
after they become aware of deficiencies in the State's
warnings to the public: Macias v. State.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Macias v. State,' the California Supreme Court addressed whether,
during a state of emergency, manufacturers and distributors of malathion
are liable for their failure to warn the public after supplying the govern-
ment with the insecticide malathion and then discovering that the state's
warnings regarding the aerial spraying of the malathion were deficient.'
Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme court held
that the defendants had no duty to warn the plaintiffs, based upon policy
considerations that favor non-interference with the State's ability to
quickly and effectively deal with emergency situations.'
1. 10 Cal. 4th 844, 897 P.2d 530, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 592 (1995). In this decision,
Justice Arabian delivered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Jus-
tices Kennard, Baxter, George and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 846-60, 897 P.2d at
531-40, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593-602. Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at
861-65, 897 P.2d at 541-44, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603-06 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 846-60, 897 P.2d at 531-40, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593-602. In Macias, Cali-
fornia declared a state of emergency in order to protect the agricultural industry and
agricultural properties from an infestation of the Mediterranean fruit fly, commonly
known as the medfly. Id. at 847-48, 897 P.2d at 532, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594. The
State purchased malathion, manufactured and distributed by the defendants, and con-
tracted to have the malathion aerially sprayed in the areas of infestation. Id. at 848,
897 P.2d at 532, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594. Based on a declared state of emergency, the
State applied for and was given a "special local needs registration" from the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA), which permitted an "off label" use of malathion. Id.
The special local needs registration required that the State give handouts to the pub-
lic describing the dates which the spraying would occur, the type of material to be
sprayed, as well as the precautions listed on the product label. Id. The plaintiffs,
Alfonso and Sophia Macias, along with their son Juan, lived in one of the treatment
areas. Id. at 848, 897 P.2d at 533, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595. Juan eventually went blind
after a large amount of the insecticide fell on his head, face, and other parts of his
body. Id. at 849, 897 P.2d at 533, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595. Plaintiffs claimed that the
warnings distributed by the State to the public were inadequate because the flyer did
not contain the health warnings required by the EPA. Id. at 848, 897 P.2d at 533, 42
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that because the defendants
manufactured and distributed the product, they were liable in either a strict products
liability or a negligence cause of action because they breached a common law duty
to warn. Id. at 850, 897 P.2d at 534, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596.
3. Id. at 856-60, 897 P.2d at 538-40, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600-02.
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II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. No Private Tort Duty can be Imposed on Defendant
Manufacturers and Distributors to Warn the Public During a State
Emergency
Justice Arabian, writing for the majority, addressed whether the de-
fendant manufacturers and distributors were required to warn the public
of the dangers of malathion in the midst of a state emergency.4 In begin-
ning his opinion, Justice Arabian first explained the profound signifi-
cance of a declared state of emergency, recognizing that it requires a
state to respond effectively in order to prevent "extreme peril to life,
property, and the resources of the state."5 Defending the actions of the
State as pursuant to its authority under the Emergency Services Act,6
and looking to past cases which have specifically addressed malathion
spraying,' the court held that in the instant case the State's actions were
necessary to preserve the general welfare of California 8
4. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (explaining the
liability of a product supplier for negligent failure to warn); Richard D. Chappuis, Jr.,
The F ight of the Toxic Tort--Aerial Application of Insecticides and Herbicides:
From Drift Liability to Toxic Tort, 58 J. AIR L. & CoM. 411 (1992) (discussing law-
suits being brought as a result of the aerial application of pesticides); Sean A. Mur-
phy, Comment, Aerial Pest Eradication in Massachusetts and California and the
Pesticide Malathion, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 851 (1992) (describing problems
associated with aerial pest eradication); Tybe A. Prett & Jane E.R. Potter, Risks to
Human Health Associated with Exposure to Pesticides at the Time of Application
and the Role of the Courts, 1 ViLa ENvTL. LJ. 355 (1990) (discussing the risks posed
by the application of pesticides).
5. Macias, 10 Cal. 4th at 853-56, 897 P.2d at 536-38, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598-600.
6. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 8550 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (defining the purpose
of the California Emergency Services Act). See generally 58 CAL JUR. 3D State §§ 48-
51 (1980 & Supp. 1995) (summarizing the authority granted to the government under
the California Emergency Services Act); 8 B.E. WrrIUN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW,
Constitutional Law § 784 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing the nature of a state's police
power).
7. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. State, 175 Cal. App. 3d 494, 501, 221 Cal. Rptr. 225,
229 (1985) (justifying malathion spraying based on the potential negative impact the
Medfly infestation could have on the economy); Talevich v. Voss, 734 F. Supp. 425,
434 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (upholding the practice of malathion spraying against constitu-
tional claims of deprivation of liberty or property interests).
8. Macias, 10 Cal. 4th at 856-57, 897 P.2d at 538, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600.
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The court next turned its attention to the more immediate issue of
whether, under a products liability cause of action,9 the defendants had
a private duty to warn the public of the dangers of the emergency mala-
thion spraying when the defendants allegedly knew the State's warnings
were inadequate.'" Attacking the plaintiffs' argument, the court stated
that the defendant manufacturers and distributors are under no such
duty to warn the public during a state of emergency." The court further
reasoned that compelling a private citizen or corporation to interfere
with the State's efforts would have a devastating effect on the State'
ability to function properly in emergency situations.' 2 Basing its argu-
ments largely on policy, 3 the court concluded that necessitating a pri-
vate tort duty would "second-guess" the legislative policy behind the
Emergency Services Act and would be in direct conflict with the State's
sovereign authority.'4
9. See generally 6 B.E. WrrITN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 1265 (9th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the duty to warn in products liability); Charles C.
Marvel, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Liability for Failure to Warn as De-
pendent on Defendant's Knowledge of Danger, 33 A.L.R. 4th 368 (1984) (discussing
whether defendant's lack of scientific knowledge of danger constitutes a defense in
products liability causes of action); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Failure to Warn as
Basis of Liability Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 53 A.L.R. 3d 239 (1973
& Supp. 1995) (discussing cases where failure to warn formed the basis of liability
under strict liability in tort); M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Lia-
bility: Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 221 (1987) (discussing the duty to
warn in products liability); Michael A. Pittenger, Note, Reformulating the Strict Lia-
bility Failure to Warn, 49 WASH. & LEE L REV. 1509 (1992) (discussing the problems
of strict liability under current law).
10. Macias, 10 Cal. 4th at 857-59, 897 P.2d at 539-40, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601-02.
See generally 72 C.J.S. Products Liability § 28 (1975 & Supp. 1995) (detailing the
duty of a supplier to adequately warn of possible dangers arising from the use of a
product); 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 772 (1984 & Supp. 1995) (discussing
insecticides, pesticides and like products in the context of products liability).
11. Macias, 10 Cal. 4th at 857-58, 897 P.2d at 539-40, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601-02.
See generally 50 CAL. JUR. Products Liability § 16 (1993) (explaining the duty of a
manufacturer or distributor to warn); 6 B.E. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CAItFORNIA LAW,
Torts § 1272 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the manufacturer's scope of
liability in products liability cases).
12. Macias, 10 Cal. 4th at 857-58, 897 P.2d at 539-40, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601-02.
13. "When deciding whether to expand a tort duty of care, courts must consider
the potential social and economic consequences." Id. at 859, 897 P.2d at 540, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 602; see also Moore v. Regents of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 146, 793
P.2d 479, 495, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 162 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991)
(holding that "[in deciding whether to create new tort duties we have in the past
considered the impact that expanded liability would have on activities that are impor-
tant to society").
14. Macias, 10 Cal. 4th at 858, 897 P.2d at 539, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601. See gener-
ally 46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 9 (1978 & Supp. 1995) (discussing policy consider-
ations in imposing duty).
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The court also declared that the imposition of a private tort duty to
warn might cause private entities or government entities to fear civil
lawsuits and damages to such an extent that they may challenge the
State's judgment. 5 The result could mean a halt in the shipment of pes-
ticides, potentially damaging the public interest and resulting in chaos.
Based on such rationale, the court held that the imposition of a private
duty to warn or otherwise intervene could severely compromise the
State's efforts, and place the lives, property and resources of the citizens
of California in jeopardy. 7
2. State's Health Warnings Conformed to Statutory Requirements
The court next addressed the sufficiency of the State's health warnings
to the public, and held that no duty to warn could be imposed upon the
defendant manufacturers and distributors because the health warnings
distributed by the State were sufficient to satisfy the statutory require-
ments." Furthermore, the court argued, had the defendants given their
own warning notices to the public as the plaintiffs advocate, the whole
eradication program would likely have been fatally compromised. 9 The
public concerns and confusion caused by these additional warnings
would have delayed the implementation of a critically important program
where "time was of the essence."0
3. Preemption Need not be Addressed
Based on its decision that the defendants owed no duty of care to the
plaintiffs, the court declined to address the issue of whether plaintiffs'
15. Macias, 10 Cal. 4th at 858-59, 897 P.2d at 539, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
16. Id. at 859, 897 P.2d at 53940, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601-02.
17. Id. at 860, 897 P.2d at 540, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
18. Id. at 857, 897 P.2d at 538, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600. The health warnings were
designed by the Department of Food and Agriculture during the 1989-1990 Medfly
eradication program. Id. The distributed health warning leaflets contained both Eng-
lish and Spanish language, provided health information, and included telephone num-
bers to call for additional information. Id. Furthermore, health department officials
appeared in the news to discuss concerns, and established a telephone "hot line" to
answer questions. Id. at 857, 897 P.2d at 538-39, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600-01.
19. Id. at 859, 897 P.2d at 540, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
20. Id. See generally 58 CAL. JuR. 3D State § 49 (1980) (describing how, during a
state of emergency, there can be a suspension of provisions of regulatory statutes,
orders, rules, or regulations of state agencies).
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claim would be preempted by federal law that regulates the labeling of
pesticides."
B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk stated that the notice
provided by the state did not conform with statutory requirements be-
cause it contained an inadequate warning of the health risks associated
with malathion.22 Justice Mosk argued that based upon fundamental no-
tions of products liability, the defendant suppliers of malathion were
liable under a common law duty to warn. Furthermore, he found con-
siderable case authority holding that the existence of a government duty
to warn does not necessarily displace a manufacturer's common law duty
to warn.24 Based upon such rationale, Justice Mosk would have affirmed
the judgment of the court of appeal.25
III. IMPACT
Prior to Macias, the California Supreme Court had not directly ad-
dressed products liability claims arising from the aerial spraying of mala-
thion. On a number of prior occasions, however, the court upheld the
policy that the security and welfare needs of society must come before
an expanded tort duty of care. Macias continues this policy of non-
interference with the State's actions during a state of emergency, and fur-
thers the notion that tort and products liability claims come secondary to
ensuring that all emergency service functions of the state, local govern-
ments, and private agencies will be effectively coordinated to deal with
any emergency that may arise. 2' As a result, Macias will likely dissuade
21. Macias, 10 Cal. 4th at 860, 897 P.2d at 540, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602. See gener-
ally 13 CAL JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 95 (1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the
doctrine of preemption).
22. Macias, 10 Cal. 4th at 861, 897 P.2d at 541, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Justice Mosk argued that the State did not meet its duty, and perhaps
omitted the warnings in a "deliberate effort to allay public anxiety and avoid public
opposition to aerial spraying of malathion." Id. at 862, 897 P.2d at 541, 42 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 603 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 862, 897 P.2d at 542, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 863, 897 P.2d at 542, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 (Mosk, J., dissenting). "No
previous case has found that a manufacturer's duty to warn is abrogated simply be-
cause a government entity has declared a state of emergency." Id. at 863, 897 P.2d at
542, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 865, 897 P.2d at 544, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 857, 897 P.2d at 538, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600.
27. Id. at 859-60, 897 P.2d at 540, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
28. Id. at 854, 897 P.2d at 536, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
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claims against private or government agencies which arise during a de-
clared state of emergency.
IV. CONCLUSION
While it is unfortunate that the plaintiffs were injured by the malathion
spraying, it is nonetheless essential that the court limit the liability of
state entities and private entities working with the state during a public
emergency. Furthermore, it must be noted that the holding in Macias is
essentially limited in application to emergency situations. Hence, in no
way does Macias advocate allowing culpable manufacturers and distribu-
tors of defective products to escape liability and governmental regula-
tions.
ROGER SHAAR, JR.
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VI. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A person who is convicted of a crime and who elects to
perform community service, instead of paying a fine, is
an employee covered under the Workers' Compensation
Act: Arriaga v. County of Alameda.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Arriaga v. County of Alameda,' the California Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a person convicted of a crime who performs community
service in lieu of paying a fine is an employee covered by the Workers'
Compensation Act.2 The court held that such a person is an employee
for purposes of workers' compensation, and therefore, injuries sus-
tained while performing community service are remedied exclusively
under the Workers' Compensation Act.3
II. TREATMENT
The court considered whether a person performing court-ordered com-
munity service is an employee whose exclusive remedy for injury is un-
der the Workers' Compensation Act (Act).4 Justice Mosk initially noted
1. 9 Cal. 4th 1055, 892 P.2d 150, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116 (1995). Justice Mosk deliv-
ered the unanimous opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, George, and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 1058-68, 892 P.2d
at 152-58, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118-24.
2. Id. at 1059, 892 P.2d at 152, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116; see CAL. LAB. CODE §§
3200-4853 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996) (Workers' Compensation Act).
The Alameda County Sheriffs Department assigned Linda Arriaga to work for
the California Department of Transportation (Cal Trans) as part of her sentence in
connection with a four year old speeding ticket. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1059, 892 P.2d
at 152, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118. Cal Trans assigned Arriaga to clean the walls of a
ventilation duct where she worked for several hours. Id. Cal Trans neither supervised
nor warned Arriaga about the toxic fumes from a solvent she was using to clean the
walls. Id. She worked without ventilation or respiratory equipment and eventually lost
consciousness. Id. at 1060, 892 P.2d at 152, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118. Arriaga sustained
injuries and filed a complaint alleging negligence against the County of Alameda and
the State of California. Id. at 1059, 892 P.2d at 152, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118. The trial
court concluded that workers' compensation was Arriaga's exclusive remedy and
dismissed the complaint. Id. at 1060, 892 P.2d at 152-53, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119. The
court of appeal affirmed and the California Supreme Court granted review. Id. at
1060, 892 P.2d at 153, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
3. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1067, 892 P.2d at 158, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124.
4. Id. at 1059, 892 P.2d at 152, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118; CAL LAB. CODE § 3351
(West 1989 & Supp. 1996) (defining "employees" for purposes of the Act). See gener-
ally Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers' Compensa-
tion Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405 (1988) (discussing the
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that the Act applies only in the context of an employment relationship.5
The court asserted that a contract of hire need not exist to establish the
employment relationship and that any person rendering service for an-
other is presumed to be an employee. The court then discussed the
purpose of the Act in order to determine the type of employment rela-
tionship that triggers its application.7 The court explained that the Act
protects individuals from the special risks of employment and, therefore,
the court determined that employment should be broadly defined.8
The court next discussed its decisions in two prior cases analogous to
the present case.' Relying on the prior holdings, the court found that
when a city receives a benefit from an individual under its control, and
the individual is exposed to the same risks as a regular employee, the
individual is an employee for purposes of workers' compensation."0 Ap-
plying this test, the court found Arriaga to be an employee under the
Act," the court reasoned that the county and the state benefitted from
individuals and the entities affected by the exclusive remedy rule); George H. Singer,
Workers' Compensation: The Assault on the Shield of Immunity, 70 N.D. L REV.
905 (1994) (analyzing exemptions to the exclusivity rule).
5. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1060, 892 P.2d at 153, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119 (citing
County of Los Angeles v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 30 Cal. 3d 391, 637
P.2d 681, 179 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1981)); see CAL LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1989 & Supp.
1996) (stating that liability exists for employee injury "arising out of or in the course
of the employment").
6. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1061, 892 P.2d at 153, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119 (citing
Laeng v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 771, 494 P.2d 1, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 377) (1972); see CAL. LAB. CODE § 3357 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996) ("any person
rendering service for another, [except] an independent contractor . . . is presumed to
be an employee"). See generally 65 CAL JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation §§ 47-55
(9th ed. 1981 & Supp. 1995) (defining "employee"); 2 B.E. WrrIGN, SUMMARY OF CAL-
FORNiA LAW, Workers' Compensation §§ 161-165 (1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing
who are employees).
7. Arraga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1061, 892 P.2d at 153, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1061-62, 892 P.2d at 154, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120; County of Los Angeles
v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 30 Cal. 3d 391, 637 P.2d 681, 179 Cal. Rptr.
214 (1981) (holding that a workfare recipient injured during work was an employee
covered under the Act); Laeng, 6 Cal. 3d 771, 494 P.2d 1, 100 Cal. Rptr. 377 (holding
that a job applicant injured during a tryout competition for a city job qualified as an
employee).
10. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1061-62, 892 P.2d at 154, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120. See
generally 82 Am. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation §§ 143-145 (1992 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing factors determining employee status); 65 CAL. JUR. 3D Work Injury Com-
pensation § 36 (1981 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the purported employer's control
over the purported employee).
11. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1062, 892 P.2d at 154, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120. See gen-
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her labor, she was subject to their control, and she was subject to the
common risks of that employment as were other employees.'" The
court, therefore, found Arriaga to be an employee covered by the Act. 3
The supreme court then addressed California State University,
Fullerton v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board,4 a court of appeal
decision that classified an individual in position similar to that as Arriaga
as a volunteer, and excluded from protection under the Act.'5 The su-
preme court premised its disagreement with the lower court's holding on
the facts and stated that a person working pursuant to a court order is
acting under compulsion.'6 The court also stated that an individual per-
forming community service in lieu of paying a fine is remunerated and is,
therefore, not performing a voluntary service.'7 Applying this analysis,
the court held that the credit Arriaga received against her fine was suffi-
cient to qualify her as an employee, and therefore, she was not a volun-
teer. 8
The court concluded by emphasizing that the Act should be liberally
construed to favor the award of workers' compensation over civil litiga-
tion. 9 The court explained that in the present case, both Alameda coun-
ty and the state of California were liable under the Act.2" Because
era/ly Michelle M. Lasswell, Workers' Compensation: Determining the Status of a
Worker as an Employee or an Independent Contractor, 43 DRAKE L REV. 419 (1994)
(discussing the general tests for determining the status of a worker).
12. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1063, 892 P.2d at 154-55, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120-21.
13. Id. at 1063, 892 P.2d at 155, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121.
14. 16 Cal. App. 4th 1819, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 50 (1993), overruled by, Arriaga, 9 Cal.
4th at 1063-64, 892 P.2d at 155, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121.
15. California State Univ., Fulerton, 16 Cal. App. 4th 1819, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 50;
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(i) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996) (stating that a volunteer not
receiving remuneration services is not an employee). See generally 65 CAL JUR. 3D
Work Injury Compensation § 59 (1981 & Supp. 1995) (discussing volunteer status
under the Act).
16. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1064, 892 P.2d at 155-56, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121-22.
17. Id. The court noted that remuneration, which removes a person from volunteer
status under Labor Code § 3352, need not be in monetary form. Id. (citing CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3352(i) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996)).
18. Id. at 1065, 892 P.2d at 156, 40 Cal. Rptr 2d at 122. See generally 82 AM. JUR.
2D Workers' Compensation § 152 (1992 & Supp. 1995) (discussing nonmonetary com-
pensation); 65 CAL. JuR. 3D Work Injury Compensation § 37 (1981 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing remuneration as affecting the evaluation of an employment relationship).
19. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1065, 892 P.2d at 156, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122. See gen-
erally 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 139 (1992 & Supp. 1995) (stating
that workers' compensation provisions should be liberally construed).
20. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1066 n.8, 892 P.2d at 157 n.8, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 123
n.8.
The county was liable for workers' compensation as the general employer and
the state was liable as the special employer. Id. The county assigned Arriaga to Cal
Trans, retaining power over her work program and was, therefore, her general em-
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Arriaga performed community service in lieu of paying a fine, she quali-
fied as an employee making the exclusive remedy for her injury recovery
under the Act.2
III. IMPACT
Prior to Arriaga, a court of appeal ruled that a person performing
community service instead of paying a fine was not an employee because
that person received no consideration to support an employment rela-
tionship.' Arriaga overruled that decision and made it clear that the
credit received against a fine is adequate remuneration and thus, estab-
lishes an employer-employee relationship."* As long as the person per-
forming services is rewarded for those services in a form other than
compensation for meals, transportation, lodging, or reimbursement for
incidental expenses, there is sufficient remuneration to establish an em-
ployment relationship.24
The court's decision in Arriaga reinforced the requirement that the
Act be liberally construed.25 The court's holding also discourages civil
litigation and, undoubtedly, more employee injuries will be remedied ex-
clusively under the Act.26
ployer. Id. at 1063, n.4, 892 P.2d at 154, 155 n.4, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120, 121 n.4.
The state was Arriaga's special employer because it assigned her to particular tasks.
Id. See generally 2 B.E. WlrITN, SUMMARY OF CAIJFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensa-
tion §§ 150-151 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing general and special employ-
ment). If the county assigned a person to work for a private nonprofit organization,
that organization would be exempt from liability. See CAL LAB. CODE § 3301(b) (West
1989).
21. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1059, 892 P.2d at 152, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118. See gen-
erally Steven E. Goren, The Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy Rule and its
Exceptions, 71 MICH. B.J. 59 (1992) (discussing various exceptions to the exclusive-
remedy provisions).
22. California State Univ., Fullerton v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 16 Cal.
App. 4th 1819, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 50 (1993); Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1063-64, 892 P.2d at
155, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121.
23. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1064-65, 892 P.2d at 155-56, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121-22.
24. Id. at 1063, 892 P.2d at 155, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121; see CAL. LAB. CODE §
3352(i) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
25. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
26. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1065, 892 P.2d at 156, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122; see CAL
LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995). See generally Catherine A. Hale, Work-
ers' Compensation-A Proposal to Protect Injured Workers From Employers'
Shield of Immunity, 20 ST. MARY's LJ. 933, 951-52 (1989) (proposing to award em-
ployees exemplary damages for injuries resulting from employers' gross negligence).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Arriaga, the California Supreme Court held that a person convicted
of a crime who elects to perform community service in lieu of paying a
fine is an employee covered under the Workers' Compensation Act.27
The court held that such a person was not a volunteer because of the
credit received against the court-imposed fine." The county and the
state were both liable for Arriaga's injuries to the extent afforded her by
the Act.29
WENDY M. HUNTER
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27. Arriaga, 9 Cal. 4th at 1059, 892 P.2d at 150, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116.
28. Id. at 1065, 892 P.2d at 156, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122.
29. Id. at 1062-63, 892 P.2d at 154-55, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120-21.
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SUMMARIES
I. Civil Procedure
An attorney who represents herself in an action
to enforce a contract that provides for the re-
covery of attorney fees may not recover attor-
ney fees for efforts spent in litigating the dis-
pute.
Trope v. Katz, Supreme Court of California, decided
October 2, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th 274, 902 P.2d 259, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d 241.
Facts. In November 1985, Bertram Katz contracted with the law firm of
Trope & Trope to represent him in a divorce proceeding. The written
contract provided for the recovery of attorney fees incurred in enforcing
the contract. Trope withdrew as counsel in February 1989, carrying an
account receivable for $163,000. In December 1989, Trope sued Katz for
breach of contract to recover the unpaid fees. Katz filed a cross-com-
plaint alleging legal malpractice. Trope represented itself in the suit. The
jury awarded Trope $163,000 on its complaint and also found in favor of
Katz, awarding him $118,500 in damages. Trope moved for an award of
attorney fees as provided in the contract. The trial court denied the mo-
tion, holding that because Trope represented itself it was not entitled to
recover attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed.
Holding. The Supreme Court of California unanimously affirmed. Gener-
ally, California follows the American rule, which requires each litigant to
pay for his or her own defense. California Civil Code section 1717 (a)
allows for parties to contract out of the American Rule by providing for
the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees incurred to enforce the con-
tract. A litigant, including an attorney, who neither pays for nor becomes
liable to pay for legal representation in a suit has not "incurred" any at-
torney fees, and therefore is not entitled to reimbursement under section
1717 or under the parties' contract. Thus, because Trope & Trope repre-
sented itself during the litigation, it incurred no attorney fees. Therefore,
the court held Trope could not recover for its time, efforts, or business
opportunities lost in defending the suit.
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II. Clerks of Court
A transfer of the county clerk's duties as ex
officio clerk of the superior court to another
official may be made before expiration of the
county clerk's elective term.
Anderson v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, decided December 11, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th
1152, 907P. 2d 1312, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766.
Facts. In June of 1994, Susan Anderson was reelected as Fresno County
Clerk for a four year term. Despite excellent performance, her duties
were set to be transferred to the court executive officer pursuant to a re-
cently passed local rule. Prior to the rule taking effect, Anderson filed an
original action with the court of appeal, seeking a writ of mandate stay-
ing implementation of the rule until the expiration of her current term.
The court of appeal granted the writ on the grounds that transfer of the
duties in the middle of the term would infringe on the electorate's right
to vote.
Holding. The supreme court began its analysis by examining two prior
decisions in which it addressed the "timing question." In the first one, the
supreme court had allowed a mid-term transfer of powers. In the second
one, the supreme court had disallowed a midterm transfer of powers.
The two cases were harmonious, however, because in the first, the pow-
ers to be transferred were outside the class of matters that are required
to be performed only by an elected official, while in the second, the
powers were necessary tO the elected office. The court therefore sur-
mised that since the powers of clerk of the superior court need not be
performed by an elected official and the appropriate statute does not
forbid it, mid-term transfer of these powers was permissible.
In a separate concurring decision, Justice Mosk agreed with the ma-
jority that the transfer was permitted by law, but questioned the fairness
of such action, considering the fact that the clerk's duties were stripped
only three weeks after her re-election, and thus the transfer appeared, at
least on its face, as punitive.
In a dissenting decision, Justice Kennard stated that the voters elected
the petitioner with the understanding that she would perform a bundle of
duties, and that transfer of any of these duties would violate the public's
right to vote on this matter and, therefore, could only be accomplished at
the end of a term, when the statute expressly allows for such transfer.
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III. Criminal Law
A. A single prior conviction for driving under the
influence of alcohol and its resulting prison
term can be used both to elevate a current
drunk driving conviction to a felony and to en-
hance the sentence without violating the bar
against multiple punishment of an act or omis-
sion.
People v. Coronado, Supreme Court of California,
decided December 21, 1995, 12 Cal. 4th 145, 906
P.2d 1232, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77.
Facts. Defendant was found guilty of driving while under the influence
of alcohol. Defendant also had three prior convictions for drunk driving
and had served three prior prison terms for felony convictions. One of
those prison terms was for felony drunk driving. This prior conviction
was used by the superior court to elevate the current offense to a felony
and its prison term was used to add a one-year enhancement to defen-
dant's sentence. The court of appeal affirmed the sentence imposed by
the superior court, finding that the enhancement was valid.
Holding. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeal. The court held that a single prior conviction for driving
under the influence and its resulting prison term can be used to both
elevate a new drunk driving conviction to a felony and to justify a one-
year enhancement of the sentence. Although the defendant argued that
the prior conviction used to elevate the current drunk driving conviction
to a felony could not also be used as an enhancement, the court conclud-
ed otherwise. The court found that the legislature did not intend to limit
the punishment that could be imposed on a habitual drunk driver. The
court also found that the dual use of defendant's prior conviction does
not violate Penal Code section 654 banning multiple punishment of an
act or omission since the enhancement is attributable to defendant's
status as a repeat offender and not the underlying criminal conduct
which gave rise to the current and prior convictions.
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B. Absent a request by the defendant, trial courts
are not required to define the phrase "reckless
indifference to human life" to the jury as it used
in the felony-murder special circumstance of
California Penal Code, section 190.2, because
the statutory meaning of the phrase is ade-
quately conveyed by a common understanding of
its terms.
People v. Estrada, Supreme Court of California,
decided November 20, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th 568, 904
P.2d 1197, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586.
Facts. Defendant was charged with first degree murder, robbery, and
burglary. Two felony-murder special circumstances, each providing for a
death sentence or life imprisonment with no possibility of parol, were
also alleged against the defendant, because the murder occurred during
the commission of both the robbery and burglary. At trial, evidence was
introduced showing that while the defendant was not the actual killer, he
was an accomplice. Pursuant to California Penal Code, section 190.2, the
trial court stated in its jury instructions that a felony-murder special cir-
cumstance is applicable to a defendant who is not the actual killer, if the
defendant is an accomplice to the underlying felony, and acted with
"reckless indifference to human life." The jury found the defendant guilty
of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary, and also found that the
felony-murder special circumstance allegations applied. Since the trial
court never defined "reckless indifference to human life" for the jury, the
defendant appealed the court's ruling, arguing that the statutory phrase
does not amply convey to the jury the meaning of California Penal Code,
section 190.2.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that the phrase "reckless indifference to human life," as used
in California Penal Code, section 190.2, is commonly understood to mean
that the defendant was subjectively aware that his participation in the
felony involved a grave risk of death. This statutory phrase therefore
does not have a technical meaning peculiar to the law, and thus trial
courts have no sua sponte duty to further define the statutory phrase for
the jury.
The court further held that when the defendant does request that the
statutory phrase be clarified for the jury, the trial court should follow the
ruling in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), which requires that a
"grave" risk of death standard be used to define "reckless indifference to
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human life," rather than an "extreme likelihood" of risk to innocent life
standard.
Lastly, the court held that the phrase "reckless indifference to human
life" comports with due process and is not unconstitutionally vague.
C. Materiality is an element of perjury which must
be decided by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt and failure to instruct the jury on the
materiality element constitutes a per se revers-
ible error.
People v. Kobrin, Supreme Court of California, de-
cided November 2, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th 416, 903 P.2d
1027, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 895.
Facts. After defendant reported receiving numerous threats by doorstep
note or telephone and the suspicious starting of two fires outside his
apartment, defendant obtained a restraining order against his neighbor,
who he swore by affidavit was responsible for the activities, and police
began surveillance of defendant's apartment.. One evening, while police
were carefully observing defendant's apartment, defendant called the
police claiming that he had just found another threatening note on his
doorstep and had chased the offender from his apartment. This seriously
conflicted with what surveillance officers had observed and when the
police sergeant confronted defendant with the inconsistencies, he con-
fessed to everything, offering various excuses for his conduct. Defendant
was subsequently charged with one count of perjury of the affidavit, six
counts of preparing a false record and nine counts of making a false
police report.
In his defense, the defendant claimed a mental impairment precluding
him from the ability to form the requisite intent, moved to dismiss the
perjury count because the falsified elements were not material to the
decision to issue the restraining order, and requested that the jury decide
the element of materiality. The judge denied both the motion and the
request and instructed the jury that, if it found that the defendant had
made one or more false statements, those statements were material. The
jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. Defendant appealed based on
the failure to submit the materiality question to the jury. Citing a well-
established line of case authority finding materiality an issue of law, not
fact, the court of appeal upheld the trial court ruling.
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Holding. In light of twenty-five years of United States Supreme Court
decisions recognizing a criminal defendant's due process right to have
every element decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and finding
that materiality is an element of perjury, the California Supreme Court
reversed the perjury conviction. The court further noted that the failure
to instruct the jury on the materiality element constitutes a per se revers-
ible error because the omission of an element adversely and directly
affects the jury's verdict.
IV. Highways and Automobiles
Drivers convicted outside California must attack
the constitutionality of those convictions in that
jurisdiction rather than through a writ of man-
date brought against a California agency that
suspended privileges as a result of that convic-
tion.
Larsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, Supreme
Court of California, decided December 26, 1995, 12
Cal. 4th 278, 906 P.2d 1306, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151.
Facts. Orange County resident Charles Larsen was arrested in New York
state for driving while intoxicated and for driving on the wrong side of
the road. Before Larsen's trial, his defense attorney submitted a guilty
plea that had not been signed by Larsen. Later, the attorney submitted an
affidavit stating that he advised Larsen of the ramifications of a guilty
plea. Larsen was convicted of "driving while ability impaired" and the
California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Larsen's li-
cense for six months upon receiving notice of the New York conviction.
Larsen filed a petition for a writ of mandate, requesting the superior
court to order the DMV to set aside its suspension of Larsen's driving
privileges on the ground that he was not advised of his trial rights prior
to entering a guilty plea in the New York court. The trial court denied
Larsen's request for the writ. The court of appeal reversed, reasoning
that California should have provided a forum to contest further punish-
ment from an out-of-state conviction if that conviction may have been
unconstitutional.
Holding. Granting review to resolve conflict among the courts of appeal,
the supreme court held that Larsen was required to contest his driving
conviction in New York rather than by requesting a writ of mandate to
set aside the suspension of privileges from a California agency. Larsen
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contended that, because the California DMV was imposing a "punish-
ment" as a result of his out-of-state conviction, the state should be re-
quired to provide a forum for him to contest the constitutionality of the
out-of-state conviction. The court first stated that the revocation of a
driver's license was a civil rather than a criminal sanction. While the
court conceded that the state could not suspend or revoke a driver's li-
cense on the basis of a conviction that was proven to be unconstitution-
al, it recognized that Larsen had not attacked the constitutionality of his
conviction in New York and that nothing prevented him from doing so.
Finally, the court concluded that there was nothing unconstitutional
about requiring Larsen to attack the constitutionality of a conviction in
the jurisdiction in which it was rendered.
V. Initiative
A county's general plans may be amended by
initiative of the local electorate.
Devita v. County of Napa, Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, decided March 6, 1995, 9 Cal. 4th 763, 889
P.2d 1019, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699.
Facts. In November 1990, the people of Napa County passed Measure J.
This provision amended the county's general plan to preserve agricultural
land within the county. The initiative provided that the county's general
plan could not be amended without the vote of the people. However,
under certain circumstances, the land could be redesignated under vari-
ous situations without violating the statute. In March 1991, several oppo-
nents of the measure filed a complaint in superior court seeking declara-
tory judgment against the statute as invalid. The complaint alleged that
the general plan could not be amended by initiative and that the authori-
ty of the county board of supervisors could not be limited by the manda-
tory voter approval requirements contained in Measure J. The trial court
denied plaintiffs relief on the ground that Measure J was a valid use of
initiative power. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's holding.
The supreme court granted review to resolve whether a county's general
plan can be amended by initiative of the people.
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Holding. The supreme court affirmed the decision of the appellate court.
The court held that the California statutory provisions governing local
planning did not prohibit amending the land use elements of local gener-
al plans by initiative. The court reasoned that California Election Code
section 9111 specifically recognized the right to amend general plans by
initiative. The court asserted that because the statute stated that an
initiative's effect on a general plan's internal consistency must be submit-
ted to the board for examination, it would be incorrect to find this type
of initiative unlawful.
In addition, the court found that the Measure J's voter approval pro-
visions were constitutional because the provision called for a legislative
act by the people. The court noted that legislative acts by the people
could also be enacted by local governing bodies, thus the powers of
these bodies was not circumscribed and therefore the provisions were
constitutional.
VI. Insurance Contracts and Coverage
Former Insurance Code section 11580.2(i) gov-
erning uninsured and underinsured motorist
claims is inapplicable to underinsured motorist
coverage since it directly conflicts with section
11580.2 (3); therefore an insured need not com-
ply with the conditions precedent in former sec-
tion 11580.2(i) before filing an underinsured
motorist claim.
Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co., California Su-
preme Court, decided December 6, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th
1049, 906 P.2d 1057, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1.
Facts. John Quintano (insured) was involved in an auto accident in
which he was covered by Mercury Insurance Co. (insurer) for both unin-
sured and underinsured motorist claims. After entering into a settlement
agreement with the tortfeasor, Quintano requested that Mercury pay the
difference between his underinsured motorist protection and the limit of
the other driver's liability policy. Mercury rejected this request, stating
that Quintano had not complied with all conditions precedent to cover-
age before the statute of limitations had run. The trial court granted
Mercury's motion for summary judgment. Quintano appealed, and the
court of appeal reversed, finding that former section 11580.2(i) was not
applicable to underinsured motorist coverage.
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Holding. The supreme court affirmed the court of appeal decision. The
court held that since the two subdivisions in question under section
11580.2 were in conflict, the conditions precedent provision of the unin-
sured and underinsured motorist statute did not apply in a claim for
underinsured motorist coverage. The court reasoned that to apply former
subdivision (i) to underinsured coverage would often defeat coverage
before the condition precedent of former subdivision (3) had occurred,
since subdivision (3) required the insured to exhaust the tortfeasor's
policy limits in a settlement or judgment as a precondition to underin-
sured motorist coverage. The court stated that in some cases, it would
prove impossible for an insured party to fulfill the conditions of subsec-
tion (3) in time to comply with the preconditions of subsection (i),
thereby allowing the insurer to refuse coverage. The court asserted that
this conflict within the statute could not have been intended by the legis-
lature, and therefore the requirements of section 11580.2(i) did not apply
to underinsured motorist claims.
VII. Lewdness, Indecency, and Obscenity
Any type of touching is sufficient to constitute
forcible lewd conduct, the touching need not be
inherently lewd.
People v. Martinez, Supreme Court of California, de-
cided November 2, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th 434, 903 P. 2d
1037, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905.
Facts. Defendant was tried on two counts of forcible lewd conduct as
well as attempted kidnapping and battery. A thirteen year-old girl was
walking home one day when the defendant, a stranger, had allegedly
wrapped his arms around her waist and attempted to kiss her on the
lips. After the girl had broken free, the defendant ran away and later
grabbed a different thirteen year-old girl and attempted the same thing,
this time grabbing her neck or shoulder as well as her mouth. Defendant
released the girl when several of the girl's family approached him. At
trial, he was convicted of all charges. The court of appeal reversed the
second count of forcible lewd conduct, finding that the touching was not
of a sufficiently sexual manner.
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Holding. The supreme court rejected the contention that forcible lewd
conduct requires touching which is inherently lewd, stating that the stat-
ute does not specify that any particular portion of the body needs to be
touched. Other crimes that are similar in nature such as sexual battery
require a specific type of touching. Because such language was absent
from the forcible lewd conduct statute, the supreme court reasoned that
the omission was intentional. It did, however, mention that the type of
touching is relevant when determining the intent of the defendant, but
that any touching is sufficient. Justice Mosk concurred with the majority,
only differing slightly in his interpretation of what constitutes a "lewd or
lascivious act."
VIII. Parent and Child
Family Code section 7895 requires the court to
appoint counsel for appellant parents after a
judgment freeing the child from parental cus-
tody or control, but not for the respondent par-
ent; however, the court has discretion to appoint
counsel for any respondent parent when the
termination of parental rights is at stake.
In re Bryce, Supreme Court of California, decided
December 26, 1995, 12 Cal. 4th 226, 906 P.2d 1275,
48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120.
Facts. In a proceeding to determine child custody, the superior court
denied the stepfather's petition to have the child declared free from the
father's custody and control based on the father's alleged abandonment.
The father petitioned the court to have counsel appointed for him after
the child's stepfather appealed the decision. The court of appeal denied
the father's request for counsel, finding that the statute only provided for
appointed counsel for appellants in child custody and control cases.
Holding. The supreme court reversed the court of appeal's decision,
holding that while section 7895 does not provide for appointed counsel
for respondents in child custody cases, the lower court should have exer-
cised its discretion to decide whether or not to appoint counsel for the
father. Looking to the language of the statute as well as its legislative
history, the court found that the two prerequisites for appointed appel-
late counsel were missing in the present case; the parent seeking court-
appointed representation must have been the appellant, and the child
must have been a dependent of the juvenile court. Since the statute ex-
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pressly stated' appellants were entitled to appointed counsel, the court
determined that the statute impliedly excluded respondents the benefit of
appointed counsel when their rights had not been terminated.
However, the supreme court noted that when the presence of counsel
may affect the ultimate outcome when determining the termination of
parental rights, the lower court should determine whether, in its discre-
tion, appointed counsel was needed. Since the lower court in this case
had automatically denied respondent appointed counsel, the supreme
court remanded the case, directing the court of appeal to exercise its
discretion to determine whether to appoint counsel for the father.
IX. Public Utilities
California Public Utility Code section 453.5 pre-
vents the Public Utilities Commission from as-
sessing a rate refund against a public utility and
using the funds for a purpose other than to re-
imburse ratepayers.
Assembly of the State of California v. Public Utili-
ties Commission, Supreme Court of California, de-
cided December 18, 1996, 12 Cal 4th 87, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 54.
Facts. In 1982, the Federal Communications Commission ordered AT&T
to reimburse its ratepayers for cellular research expenses. Pursuant to
this order, Pacific Bell received $7.9 million, but did not distribute the
funds to ratepayers. In 1993, the California Public Utilities Commission
decided that the reimbursement was intended to be distributed to
ratepayers and ordered Pacific Telesis, Pacific Bell's parent corporation,
to place $50 million, $7.9 million at 18% interest, in an account for future
distribution. The Commission noted that the intended beneficiaries,
ratepayers in the years 1974-1982, could not be identified, so the Com-
mission directed $7.9 million to be distributed to current ratepayers and
the rest to be allotted for public school telecommunications infrastruc-
ture. On rehearing, the Commission modified the disbursement and or-
dered $7.9 million plus 3.4% interest to be distributed to current
ratepayers and allotted the remainder to public school telecommunica-
tions infrastructure. The State Assembly and ratepayers questioned the
legality of the Commission's order and petitioned for review.
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Holding. The California Supreme Court annulled the Commission's order
and held that the Commission could not charge the utility company at
one rate of interest and reimburse customers at a differing rate. The
court reasoned that section 453.5 of the California Public Utility Code
restricted the Comnission's discretion with respect to the use of rate-
payer refunds. The court stated that section 453.5 prevents the Commis-
sion from refunding to ratepayers an amount which is less than what the
Commission assessed against a utility company for reimbursement.
Therefore, the court held that the California Public Utility Code preclud-
ed the Commission from exercising its discretion on the proper use of
refunds and remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceed-
ings.
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